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INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1970s, financial markets have exhibited a clear trend
towards globalization. This process, facilitated by the dismantling of
exchange controls, resulted in a dramatic rise in cross-border investment
and increased access to domestic markets by foreign institutions. Banks
led this trend, both in terms of the growth of international lending and
the emergence of multinational banks with offices spread across the
globe. In contrast, the regulation of banks remains rooted in a world divided into sovereign nation states and is implemented by respective
regulatory agencies that derive their powers from distinct politico-legal
frameworks. This combination of integrated financial markets and fragmented national regulation raises major public policy issues. In this
Article, we consider the extent to which the globalization of financial
markets has caused a convergence in the policy goals, instruments, and
styles of the various institutions charged with regulating banks in the
United States and United Kingdom. Specifically, we focus on the question of whether the creation of a global banking market has compelled
otherwise autonomous policy makers to adopt the same or similar rules
and regulations.
In a world of integrated financial markets, policy convergence
among national regulatory regimes might be expected for two main reasons. First, policy convergence between regulatory systems advances
each regulator's primary goal of curbing banks' special insolvency risk.
Linkages between banks, whether through the payments system or
through credit exposures in the interbank market, leave banks uniquely
vulnerable to contagious collapse. Today, these linkages transcend national borders, creating a substantial risk of significant transnational
spill-over effects from a bank insolvencies. Therefore, bank regulators
can no longer rely exclusively on domestic regulation to address this
basic regulatory concern and have a strong incentive to ensure that there
is adequate bank supervision abroad.' Convergence of bank supervision
1. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1975 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten countries. Originally known as the Blunden
Committee-after its first chairman-and then the Cooke Committee-after its second-its
members include the senior representatives of the bank supervisors and central banks from
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. It usually meets at the Bank for
International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland. In 1997, the Basle Committee issued its Core
Principles of Effective Bank Supervision. The Core Principles are based on the premise that
"[w]eaknesses in the banking system of a country... can threaten financial stability both
within that country and internationally." Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core
Principles for
Effective
Banking
Supervision,
(visited
Apr.
11,
1999)
<http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>.
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policy is not, of course, the only way to address the risk of cross-border
contagion. That risk could also be addressed by effective, but different,
systems of regulation in every state. Political as well as practical realties, however, suggest that convergence provides an easier, or more
likely, answer.
Second, policy convergence eliminates competitive advantages or
disadvantages that arise when banks compete internationally, but are
regulated by differing regimes. Part of the rationale for the Basel Committee's 3 1988 Accord on bank capital adequacy 4 was to remove the
perceived advantage enjoyed by weakly capitalized banks that compete
with banks whose jurisdictions impose higher capital requirements.'
These level playing field considerations have also been at the heart of
several other international agreements designed to deliver some degree
of competitive equality between institutions regulated in different national jurisdictions.
Cooperation between the agencies of various nations, facilitated by a
developing array of international institutions, thus has become an essential component of the regulatory response to globalization. International
cooperation has resulted in the widespread adoption of similar methods
and techniques of regulation, and has produced agreements in which
national regulators have adopted harmonized standards.7 We suggest that
2. Policy convergence among regulators may be the result of unequal bargaining
power. One regulator using such power might attempt to impose its own rules on othersclaiming its own to be superior. Policy convergence might also result from the almost opposite scenario in which no one regulator or subgroup of regulators has the power to impose its
own standards on others. The group, therefore, would be left with the choice of either declining to converge (thereby accepting the diverse standards within the group requiring, at
very least, each regulator to understand the regulatory approach of the others) or adopting
distinct, uniform standards for all. The latter might prove the easier choice.
3. See supra note 1 (describing the formation of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision).
4. See infra Part II.F.2.
5. See generally ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (1994).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD DALE, RISK AND REGULATION IN GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKETS

(1996).
7. The idea of policy convergence can involve a number of different dimensions. One
regulator defined convergence as "the process of applying increasingly similar rules to a
given situation in different jurisdictions, and is closely related to the harmonisation or approximation of laws." Andrew M. Whittaker, Tackling Systemic Risk on Markets: Barings
and Beyond, in THE FUTURE FOR THE GLOBAL SECURITIES MARKET 259, 261 (F. Oditah ed.,

1996). This is best thought of as convergence of policy content that C.J. Bennett defines as
"the more formal manifestations of government policy-statutes, administrative rules, regulations, court decisions and so on." What is Policy Convergence and What Causes it?, 21
BRIT.J. POL. Sci. 215, 218 (1991). Policy convergence, however, is comprised of a number
of different dimensions including: policy goals, "a coming together of intent to deal with
common policy problems"; policy instruments "i.e. the institutional tools available to administer policy, whether regulatory, administrative or judicial"; and policy style, "a more
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this convergence process might be described as "negotiated convergence" because the outcome is derived from extensive negotiation
between different national authorities and involves the usual compromises and trade-offs inherent in bargaining.
In addition to negotiated convergence, the theoretical literature has
emphasized an alternative process, which we call "convergence by competition." According to this view, rather than seeking to achieve ex ante
harmonization through negotiated convergence, a more efficient solution
permits and encourages competition between regulatory regimes,
thereby allowing the optimal level of regulation to be determined by a
process of regulatory arbitrage.
This Article consists of four main parts. Part I introduces the convergence by competition model as it applies to the regulation of
financial institutions and sets the stage for the test case application of
the model to the regulatory systems in the United States and United
Kingdom. Part II provides a comparative history of bank regulation in
Britain and the United States. Central to our argument is the proposition
that, even in the presence of globalized financial markets and the opportunities for rule competition brought in their wake, the bank
regulatory systems of the United States and Britain continue to be
shaped for the most part by their prior history.
This comparative history provides the basis for Parts III and IV, in
which we aim to analyze the main regulatory changes in terms of a convergence of regulatory burden through competition. In Part III we
conclude that, while there is some evidence that bank regulators in these
countries are adopting similar approaches and methods, pronounced differences remain. In Part IV we assess the concept of competition
between rules, and consider some of the important determinants of
regulatory change that are not reflected in the competitive model. The
first is path dependence, i.e., competition is conditioned by its initial
conditions, conditions that are in place prior to the existence of significant opportunities for regulatory competition. 9 These include the public
policy objectives set for the regulatory system, which are themselves the
diffuse notion signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated (consensual
or conflictual, incremental or rational, anticipatory or reactive, corporatist or pluralist etc.)."
Id. at 219. We shall be concerned with all these different senses of convergence, although
inevitably our main concern will be with the convergence of policy content.
8. See Benn Steil, Regulatory Foundations for Global Capital Markets, in FINANCE
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

6, at 64 (Richard O'Brien ed., 1992). Steil observed that

"national regulations must themselves be subject to foreign regulatory competition, and...
ultimately the form and level of regulation will largely be determined by the jurisdictional
arbitrage activities of those who are being regulated."
9. In this case, the initial conditions are those that existed prior to significant globalization of financial markets.
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products of politics and history. These conditions also impact the relative strengths and weaknesses of each participant in the competitive
process. The second is the power of singularly domestic concerns. Even
in our global economy, the domestic agenda continues to consume the
consciousness of policy makers. The third is the process of negotiated
convergence. Any competitive analysis must take into account the impact of agreements that limit competition between regulatory authorities.
To the extent that such agreements among regulators are formed and
endure, unlike typical cartel arrangements, convergence by competition
is less predictive of changes in the regulatory landscape.
I.

CONVERGENCE BY COMPETITION

The focus on convergence by competition in the context of law and
regulation grows out of two distinct sources. In the first place, legal
theorists have produced a significant body of scholarship on the primacy
of Delaware corporate law in the United States. These commentators
have observed states competing-with Delaware emergent as the clear
winner-for corporate charters through their body of corporate law. The
Delaware phenomenon has been both criticized, for producing laws that
favor management over shareholder interests in a "race to the bottom"
among competing states,' ° and hailed for the efficient results of such
competition in a "race to the top.""

10. See Joel Seligman, The Case for Federal Minimum CorporateLaw Standards, 49
MD. L. REV. 947, 971 (1990) (discussing the deterioration of constraints on corporate man-

agers and proposing reform); Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an InterestGroup Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tx. L. REv. 469 (1987) (applying an interest
group model to the Delaware phenomenon that draws, in part, on the race to the bottom theory); William L. Cary, Federalismand CorporateLaw: Reflections Upon Delaware,83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing for federal intervention to address Delaware's race to the bottom).
See also Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L.
REv. 709, 752 (1987) (arguing that shareholders "benefit from state competition, while
granting that, on occasion, competition may well produce laws that shareholders in some
firms would not choose to adopt voluntarily.").
11. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in CorporateLaw, 26 J.L. &
EcoN. 395, 398 (1983) (arguing "that the states' legal rules generally provide investors with
the sort of voting arrangements they would find desirable if contracts could be arranged and
enforced at low cost."). See also Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 261
(1980) (arguing that shareholders "do not earn negative abnormal returns when managements initiate a change in the state of incorporation to a state which is supposedly more
promanagement."); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the Theory
of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977) (arguing that "competitive legal systems should tend toward optimality and that [s]tate corporation codes in fact seem quite
consistent" with optimality).
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The second source of this literature derives from the work of
economists on the concept of competition in the provision of public
goods, for example defense, law and order, or regulation. The core theoretical problem concerns the way in which consumer-voters can register
their demand for these public goods, because no "market type" solution
appears to exist for determining the optimal output. However, following
the work of Tiebout on fiscal competition, a body of economic literature
has developed that stresses the efficiency of permitting different jurisdictions to compete by providing different levels of public services at
different "prices," i.e., tax rates. This model assumes that consumers
will vote with their feet by relocating to 2 the jurisdiction that most
1
closely matches their bundle of preferences.
Proponents of regulatory competition are not always clear whether
they posit the theory descriptively or normatively. Both elements of the
theory appear to be present in equal measure. In this Article, we focus
on the theory of regulatory competition as an explanatory tool for a
process of policy convergence. While not all subscribers to this theory
draw the conclusion that policy convergence will be the necessary result
of competition between rules," a number of them have. This is a consequence of their specific interpretation of rule competition as one in
which a central role is assigned to the arbitrage opportunities presented
by the different "prices" charged by regulators for their services. Just as
the existence of arbitrage opportunities means that the price of the same
product in different markets will converge on a single price, so regulatory arbitrage might be expected to give rise to a convergent level of
regulation."
There have been a number of attempts to apply this body of theoretical literature to the specific example of bank regulation. Unlike some
other forms of competition in the provision of public goods, competition
12. The seminal contribution to this literature is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). However, support for the concept of competitive provision of public goods has been offered from a number of other economic
perspectives, including those of the public choice school, which stresses the potential for
competition to reduce rent-seeking behavior by politicians and bureaucrats. The work of F.A.
Hayek is also central to this concept. See generally, EA. HAYEK, I LAw, LEGISLATION, &
LIBERTY

(1973).

13. There is no necessary reason why it should, since under Tiebout's model of fiscal
competition, differences in the supply of public goods will reflect different preferences of
customer-voters.
14. See Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in International Financial Regulation and
Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 241, 246 (1991). Whether or not that level of regulation is optimum depends, of course,
on how one defines regulatory goals. Professor Trachtman notes that if the goal of regulation
is to enhance economic efficiency, then a competitive drive to limit regulatory costs would
be consistent with that goal.
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in bank regulation does not directly center on attracting filing fees or
other enhancements to a given state's tax base, although there will undoubtedly be some fiscal advantages to a jurisdiction that is able to
attract a large number of banks to its financial markets.
In the case of bank regulation, the competition is inevitably more
complex.' 5 Considered from this point of view, nations' regulators compete with one another as providers of regulatory services.' 6 Thus, writes
Kane, "financial analysis has focused traditionally on competition for
customers by those who produce and distribute financial services. But
running parallel to this competition between private financial institutions is a less-visible layer of competition for rights to produce and
deliver regulatory services to [f]inancial institutions." 7 Financial institutions compete on the basis of the price of their services; financial
regulators' 8 compete on the basis of a "net regulatory burden" (NRB).
The NRB model recognizes that regulators dispense both costs and
benefits.' 9 Regulatory costs are incurred by institutions as a result of
"effective regulatory constraints and regulators' explicit charges. 2 °
Regulatory constraints include capital requirements, lending limits, liquidity ratios, reserve requirements, and activities limitations. Benefits
include "(1) minimizing the cost of certifying the integrity and competence of individual institutions and other contracting parties; (2)
improving productive efficiency by providing coordinating services that
lower transactions costs; (3) assuring the stability and orderliness of the
system over time; and (4) monitoring industry pricing arrangements for

15. See Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction,34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 47, 77 (1993). Professor Trachtman observes that "[rlather

than merely collecting tax revenues, a state will have multiple policies to integrate. These
policies include traditional domestic regulatory goals like fair and competitive markets, protection of the environment, and maintenance of a stable financial system. Each policy will be
substantively related to the bases for jurisdiction applied in a different way. Differential
mobility will operate differently with respect to each policy. On this basis, regulatory competition is an extremely complex game."
16. See Edward Kane, Competitive FinancialRegulation: An InternationalPerspective,
TO INTERNATIONAL FINANcIAL STABILITY (R. Portes and A. Swoboda eds., 1987).
See also Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation,
30 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1977) (exploring the issue of domestic regulatory competition in detail).
17. Kane, supra note 16, at 119.
18. Unless otherwise indicated, we use the term "regulator" in a broad sense, i.e., as encompassing both the lawmakers and administrative agencies responsible for bank regulation

inTHREATS

in each country.
19. See Roy C. SNTH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANING 172 (1997). Smith and Walter describe these elements as "taxes" and "subsidies."
20. JONATHAN STORY AND INGO WALTER, POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 132 (1994).
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anti-competitive behaviour."2' The NRB is the ratio of these costs and
benefits. It varies among regulators just as it varies among regulatees.22
Differences in NRBs are assumed to be akin to differences in quoted
prices on any set of substitute services. Firms, therefore, can be expected
to arbitrage between different regulatory regimes, affiliating with the
one that can offer the lowest NRB. In an international context,
Regulatory burdens deemed excessive in one country can
prompt banks and/or their clients to move to another jurisdiction
where the burdens are lighter-a form of 'regulatory arbitrage'
that can both erode the gains associated with financial intermediation and cause regulators to soften their approach, possibly
excessively So.23
The theory stresses, however, that competition between rules will not
eliminate regulation, since some level of regulation will remain necessary given the over-riding importance of public confidence in the
stability and integrity of financial markets.24 Moreover, Smith and Walter contend that "a long-run equilibrium can be maintained with a
positive NRB ...Financial institutions ought to value their access to
lender-of-last-resort facilities, deposit/liability insurance, the opportu25
nity to be headquartered in a stable political climate, and the like.
Their conclusion is bolstered by their observation that institutions in
wholly unregulated markets, with an NRB approaching zero, have not
dominated financial transactions.
A model of competition on the basis of respective NRBs can be
used to analyze the process of policy convergence among regulatory
regimes. For example, with regard to national stock and bond markets,
the introduction of negotiated commission rates on the New York Stock
Exchange in 197526 sparked a series of deregulatory measures in Lon-

21. Kane, supra note 16, at 120.
22. Firms can raise or lower their NRB by engaging in more or less taxed versus subsidized activities. All other things being equal, one would expect firms to seek the mix of
taxed versus subsidized activities that would yield the lowest NRB.
23. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 19, at 155.
24. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, The FederalResponse, and The Case For Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAm L. REv. 1133,
1242 (1990) (asserting that the competition in laxity argument "overlooks the strong incentive of both elected public officials and appointed bank regulators to avoid bank failures.").
25. SMITH & WALTER, supra note 19, at 177.
26. See Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's
National Market System, 56 N.YU. L. REv. 883, 901 (1981) (noting that the Securities and
Exchange Commission abolished fixed commissions on May 1, 1975 (known as "May Day"
on Wall Street)).
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don, Tokyo, Toronto, and Paris. 27 Story and Walter argue that in these
financial centers "restrictive pricing conventions have been eliminated
and business practices liberalised. Regulatory convergence has thus
come some distance., 28 Moreover, Story and Walter predict that
Progressive convergence in regulation of banks and securities
firms will continue, with players based in the more heavily
regulated countries successfully lobbying for liberalisation, and
the emergence among regulators of a consensus on minimum
acceptable standards that will eventually be accepted by home
countries with substandard regulatory regimes. 29
In other words, competition in rules will result in a process of convergence in which regulators eventually come to adopt the same basic
norms.
This Article aims to test this hypothesis by examining recent
changes in bank regulatory policy in Britain and the United States. If, in
a world of integrated financial markets, convergence of regulatory regimes can be observed, it should be especially apparent in the
approaches to bank regulation of these two countries.
First, regulatory convergence might be predicted on the basis of the
long history of competition between the British and U.S. financial markets. Since at least the 1930s, when Sterling and the U.S. Dollar began
competing with one another to be the world's reserve currency, the City
of London and New York have vied for the title of financial capital of
the world. In the 1950s, competition intensified, and the world-wide
deregulatory trend initiated two decades ago raised competition to new
heights. In this competitive process London was initially the beneficiary
of differential regulation in the two jurisdictions. 3° The interest rate ceilings imposed on U.S. dollar deposits by the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Q3" were one of the main factors behind the growth of an offshore dollar deposit market in London, soon to be joined by the market
for off-shore deposits denominated in other currencies. These pools of
27. SARIS J. KHOURY, THE DEREGULATION OF THE WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS (1990)
(discussing this international deregulatory trend).
28. STORY & WALTER, supra note 20, at 177.
29. Id.
30. The dramatic increase in the number of U.K. branches established by member banks
of the Federal Reserve System provides evidence. In 1959, seven member banks had a total
of only ten branches in the U.K. with aggregate deposits of less than one billion dollars. By
1975, the number of member bank branches in the U.K. had risen to 55 and the deposits of
these banks had risen to more than $70 billion. By 1985 member banks had 68 U.K.
branches. See LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL CITY RESEARCH PROJECT, SUBJECT REPORT XI:
THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING

31. 12 C.F.R. § 217 (1999).

4-5 (1994).
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ready liquidity in turn contributed to the growth of the Eurobond markets, the development of which was further fostered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission's burdensome registration requirements, the
separation of investment and commercial banking under the Banking
Act of 1933,32 and by the Interest Equalization Tax imposed in the
United States in 1963 on bond interest. 33 Given this long history of
competition, these two financial centers provide a valuable test for the
theory of convergence by competition.
Second, the basic similarities of the economic and legal systems of
the two countries provide a basis on which to test the hypothesis of convergence of NRB through competition. These similarities mean that a
variety of extraneous factors, which might potentially impact on the
NRB, can be held constant when assessing the comparative behavior of
the bank regulatory regimes in Britain and the United States. For example, their economic systems are widely viewed as belonging to the same
basic type in contrast to those of Continental Europe and Japan
("CEJ"). 34 Anglo-Saxon capitalism is distinguished from that of the CEJ
countries by its greater reliance on capital markets as opposed to bank
finance, in the separation of banking and commerce, and in corporate
governance arrangements that stress the role of portfolio investors rather
than equity stakes held by banks over long periods of time.35 In addition,
both Britain and the United States share a commitment to free and open
markets and to a minimalist governmental role in the economy. Unlike
the CEJ countries, government neither acts as the promoter of national
champions, nor is public ownership of major banks a feature of their
financial systems. Finally, both countries share a broad political and
cultural heritage, reflected in a general consensus in favor of economic
liberalism, and a legal system based on the common law rather than the
civil law systems of Continental Europe. These many common features
allow an examination of these two countries' approach to bank regula32. See infra Part II.B.2.b. The restrictions on the combination of commercial with investment banking contained in the 1933 Act apply only to the domestic activities of U.S.
banks. Overseas, U.S. commercial banks and their affiliates are among the top underwriters
in the Eurobond market, and in 1985 enjoyed 11% of that market. London is the leading
financial center for Eurobond trading. See GEORGE J. BENSToN, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT BANKING 9-10 (1990).
33. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE 441
(2d ed. 1993).
34. See MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM AGAINST CAPITALISM (Paul Haviland trans.,
Whurr Publishers Ltd. 1993) (discussing the pronounced similarities between England and
the United States).
35. See generally Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance:
Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv.
51 (1998).
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tion, while holding constant many other factors that distinguish their
approach from that of the CEJ countries.
Notwithstanding the existence of competition between their financial markets and their marked economic and legal similarities, we argue
that little evidence exists to suggest that regulation in the United States
and the United Kingdom is converging as a result of competitive pressures. Absent the major international agreements that represent the
outcome of negotiated convergence, the systems of rules, regulations,
and norms applicable to banks in these two jurisdictions have not been
notably convergent. Significant differences of policy approach and style
remain, the kinds of policy instruments employed by regulatory agencies exhibit significant divergence, and the methods of regulation remain
diverse.
Hence, little evidence suggests that regulatory competition between
Britain and the United States has so far produced an outcome that approximates the convergence predicted by Story and Walter. Indeed, we
argue that while regulatory competition may play an important role in
the evolution of regulatory regimes, the competitive model-particularly
as enshrined in the NRB--does not account for a number of other
equally, and at times more, significant determinants of change.
IX. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION

Despite the fact that the ultimate supervisory goal of the two countries is the same, i.e., safety and soundness, the story of bank regulation
in the United Kingdom versus United States is very different in the
telling. For the United Kingdom, the story involves few characters: essentially, the Bank of England (the Bank) and a concentrated industry
dominated by a few elite firms. 36 The plot centers on how the relationship withstood good times and bad, and how the supervisory
relationship ultimately proved defective. In contrast, and perhaps not
surprising for Americans, the story of U.S. bank regulation is one of
excess: a fragmented industry supervised by a myriad of regulators. The
history is driven by the attempts of this crowded cast of characters to
stake out and maintain ground. While U.S. bank regulators are

36. Throughout this Article references to the United Kingdom should be interpreted as
applying to England and Wales in the first instance. For much of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Scotland preserved a distinctive banking system, based on joint stock liability.
Only in the early twentieth century did the two systems begin fully to integrate. Modem
legislative developments apply, of course, to all parts of the United Kingdom.
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commonly viewed as successful in their jobs, the United States' unique
experience with bank failure plays an important role in the tale.
This Part provides an account of the development of prudential bank
regulation in the United States and United Kingdom, beginning in the
Nineteenth Century when the main building blocks of both regulatory
systems began to be put in place. Our focus is on regulatory measures
aimed at preserving bank safety and soundness; we do not attempt to
catalog measures aimed at implementing monetary policy. In attempting
to identify some common themes in the development of each regulatory
regime, perfect chronology is sometimes sacrificed.
A. Early Regulation
The most important elements of prudential regulation in the United
States and United Kingdom were established during the Twentieth
Century. Still, the seeds for each country's system were planted much
earlier. In the United States, legislation dating back to the Civil War
provides some of the most enduring idiosyncrasies associated with U.S.
regulation of banks. In the United Kingdom, the Nineteenth Century
saw the establishment of the main outlines of the British banking industry's organization that ultimately impacted regulation. Towards the end
of the last century, the Bank of England emerged as a recognizably
modern central bank, while the Federal Reserve System was established
in the early years of the Twentieth Century. These developments began
a long struggle for both central banks with their respective roles as bank
regulators.
1. U.K.'s Bank of England Loses Monopoly and is
Established as a Central Bank.
From its foundation in 1694 until well into the Nineteenth Century,
the Bank of England dominated the banking scene in Britain in a way
that has no analogue in the United States.37 It was established as a commercial bank enjoying an extensive range of governmentally conferred
privileges. In particular, it was alone among banks in being permitted to
raise capital from a large body of investors.38 All other banks in England
and Wales were forced to adopt the partnership form, and were limited
37. The Second Bank of the United States might potentially have developed into the
same sort of role which the Bank of England had come to occupy in Britain by the second
half of the nineteenth century. President Andrew Jackson, however, vetoed its charter renewal in 1832. JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW & REGULATION

8 ( 2d ed. 1997).
38. This privilege was granted in 1708, some years after the Bank's foundation. See SIR
A HISTORY 1694-1797, at 65 (1945).

JOHN CLAPHAM, THE BANK OF ENGLAND:
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to a maximum of six partners. In consequence, outside London, where
the Bank of England was dominant, banking remained comparatively
undeveloped throughout much of the Eighteenth Century.3 9 Nonetheless,
the general credit expansion resulting from the Napoleonic Wars resulted in a three-fold increase in the number of "country" banks, many
of which were seriously undercapitalized. A growing crop of failures
during the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century culminated in a general crisis in 1825-26 in which 93 banks in England and Wales found
themselves unable to meet their customers' demands for cash. As a result, Lord Liverpool's administration introduced the 1826 Joint-Stock
Bank Act ("1826 Act") that produced a much needed liberalization of
the law.
The 1826 Act was the most significant Nineteenth Century bank
40
legislation in the U.K.. It extracted the Bank of England's legislatively
mandated monopoly by permitting the formation of banks with an unlimited number of partners or shareholders outside a radius of sixty-five
miles from London. The 1826 Act "laid the legal foundation for the
emergence of the modern form of bank-a bank whose capital structure
and large capital resources enabled it to build up an extensive national,
indeed international, business.",4' By the end of the Nineteenth Century
this legislation had provided the basis for the formation of a highly concentrated banking industry based on a few joint-stock commercial banks
that operated extensive branch networks throughout large sections of
England and Wales. Formed by a process of amalgamation that gathered
pace towards the end of the century, this handful of very large institutions were generally referred to as "the Big Five."
The tight concentration that marks the modern U.K. banking industry, however, was still some way off in the first half of the
Nineteenth Century. In the shorter term, the new joint stock banks
were scrutinized by lawmakers. 42 The 1844 Joint-Stock Bank Act
39. In 1750, approximately twelve private banks operated in the provinces.
COLLINS, MONEY AND BANIUNG THE IN

U.K.: A HISTORY

10

MICHAEL

(1988).

40. For a rare study of the immediate impact of this legislation on banks in England and
Wales, see P. L. Cottrell and Lucy Newton, Banking Liberalization in England and Wales,
1826-1844, in THE STATE, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION 75
(Richard Sylla et al. eds., 1999).
41. COLLINS, supra note 39, at 10.
42. A House of Commons Secret Committee on the Joint Stock Banks (Secret Committee), reporting in 1836, noted, inter alia, that the minimum nominal capital of the joint stock
banks was not mandated by law and could vary significantly from institution to institution.
See Report of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons on Joint Stock Banks, 20th
August 1836, in SELECT STATUTES, DOCUMENTS & REPORTS RELATING To BRITISH BANKING,
1832-1928 219, 227 (T. E. Gregory ed. 1929). The Secret Committee also noted that "the
Law does not provide for any publication of the liabilities and assets of these Banks, nor
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("1844 Act") 43 tightened the legislative framework around these institutions. The restrictions imposed by the 1844 Act resulted in a hiatus in
the establishment of new banks,"' but did not prevent bank failures 5
The tighter regulation was in any case to be short-lived. The 1844 Act
was repealed in 1857, effectively assuring the dominance of joint stock
banking in the British financial system. The demise of the 1844 Act
marked the end of attempts to use statute-based banking regulation in
the U.K. for well over a century.
Following the 1840s, banking legislation largely followed the trend
of general corporate law reform. The repeal of the tight restrictions of
the 1844 Act was followed by a series of Acts (1858-62) that extended
the right of limited liability to shareholders generally, culminating in the
1879 Companies Act 46 that applied limited liability to bank shareholders. The 1879 Companies Act, like the 1844 Act, imposed an annual
external audit requirement on the accounts of banking companies.
Banking was not, however, subject to statute-based authorization procedures or on-going supervision, nor was there a clear legal definition of a
bank or of what constituted the business of banking.47
does it enforce the communication of any balance sheet to the Proprietors at large." Id. In
addition, banks were not prevented from speculation in their own stock and were not required to make adequate provision for bad debts before paying dividends. Id.
43. Joint-Stock Bank Act (1844 Act), 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 113 (1844) (Eng.). The
1844 Act prescribed minimum nominal capital of £100,000, with at least one half of the
nominal amount required to be paid up before a bank could commence business. Bank shares
had to be issued in a denomination of £100. The 1844 Act required that the deed of partnership should be in a form approved by the Privy Council and provided that no bank should be
permitted to purchase or lend upon the security of its own shares. The act also required a
statement of assets and liabilities to be published once each month, and the examination of
annual accounts by auditors elected by the shareholders.
44. The 1844 Act was the initiative of Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, who seems to
have regarded the law as an adjunct to his Bank Charter Act of 1844. The Bank Charter Act
gave an effective monopoly of bank note issue to the Bank of England, while the 1844 Act
was designed to further strengthen the banking system by introducing a regulatory regime for
the new joint-stock banks. Id. Walter Bagehot observed "in this, as in many other cases,
perhaps Sir R. Peel will be found to have been clear sighted rather than far sighted. He was
afraid of certain joint stock banks which he saw rising around him; but the effect of his legislation was to give these very banks, if not a monopoly, at any rate an exemption from new

rivals."

WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET:

A

DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET

123

(1962).
45. The Royal British Bank, which collapsed in 1856, was one of the relatively few
banks to be formed following the passage of the 1844 Act. See Theodor Emmanual Gregory,
Introduction to I SELECT STATUTES & REPORTS RELATED TO BRITISH BANKING, 1832-1928,
supra note 42, at xlvi.
46. The 1879 Companies Act 42 & 43 Vict. c. 76 (Eng.). The Act was passed in response, in part, to the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878.
47. The lack of statutory definition of banking in English law gave rise to a surprising
lack of legal problems until the case of United Dominions Trust v. Kirkwood, I Lloyd's Rep.
418 (Q.B. 1966), in which the central issue became whether the plaintiffs-a credit granting
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The Nineteenth Century also saw the transformation of the Bank of
England from the dominant commercial bank to an institution that while
remaining privately owned, began to discharge some of the recognizable
functions of a modern central bank. The Bank became the custodian of
the banking system's reserves of coin and bullion against its note and
deposit liabilities, and the existence of this large reserve meant that the
Bank was able to act as the ultimate supplier of cash to the financial
system in times of liquidity shortage. It gradually began to take on the
role of lender of last resort without making an explicit commitment to
accept this responsibility. While the Bank's willingness to provide support to institutions was not unqualified, 48 by the time Walter Bagehot
published Lombard Street in 1873, the Bank's role as lender of last resort during liquidity crises was entrenched.
2. United States Establishes a Dual Banking System
and a Central Bank.
One of the modem complexities of the U.S. regulatory system was
also established in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. The dual
banking system49 was the unintended byproduct of Congress' decision in
1863 to create national banks.5 ° States began chartering banks long before the federal government did. Congress passed the National Bank Act
of 1863 to provide for a uniform national currency to help finance the
Civil War expecting that state banks would convert their charters to
institution-were conducting an unlicensed money lending business, as alleged by counsel
for the defendant. "Banks" were exempted from the need to obtain a license under the Moneylenders Acts 1900-27, but the Acts did not define what was a bank, nor was the case law a
satisfactory guide. The lack of clarity in this point resulted in Section 123 of the Companies
Act 1967 that provided for institutions conducting the business of banking to apply to the
Department of Trade for a certificate which confirmed that they were exempt from the Moneylenders Acts. These institutions were not otherwise subject to chartering or supervision.
This legislation fostered the development of a "secondary" banking sector. See infra Part
II.D. 1.
48. It refused to support the Northern and Central Bank of England which was wound
up after incompetent and dishonest management overextended the business and, in 1866, the
Bank refused to support Overend's discount house once it became clear that the institution
was little more than a financial shell. COLLINS, supra note 39, at 189.
49. The dual banking system allows for the chartering of banks by either state or federal
authorities. For a discussion of the current status of the dual banking system, see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking System, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 263 (1996).
50. For comprehensive discussions of the history of the dual banking system, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the FederalResponse, and the Case
for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 1133, 1152-55 (1990). See
also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking
System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 677, 681-83 (1988); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual
Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1987).
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national ones. When wholesale charter conversion did not occur, Congress responded by imposing a prohibitive tax on state bank notes. State
banks, however, avoided the tax by developing checking accounts,
thereby eliminating the need for bank notes. The tax on state banks
served as an incentive for new banks to seek national charters. Soon national banks began receiving charters, along with their state
counterparts, firmly establishing the dual banking system."
The National Bank Act 5 2 established the basic elements of bank
regulation and monetary control. 3 The Office of the Comptroller54 of the
Currency ("OCC"), a new office in the Department of the Treasury, was
established to administer the act. While it was not controversial at that
time, because corporations were generally granted only specific, enumerated powers, the National Bank Act included a provision delineating
"the business of banking," which has been the subject of later and much
recent controversy and commentary. Section 8 of the National Bank Act
provided that national banks may
exercise ... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking by discounting and negotiating
promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences
of debt; by receiving deposits, buying and selling exchange,
coin, bullion; by loaning money on personal security; by ob51. For a general discussion of the chartering process at the federal and state level, see
Butler & Macey, supra note 50, at 684-89.
52. June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.). The National Bank Act was actually adopted originally in 1863 as the National
Currency Act, Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665-668.
53. The requirements for obtaining a national bank charter included:
(1) the maintenance of a reserve against deposits, which reserves were kept either
in the bank itself or in a New York City bank; (2) a sizable deposit in the form of
United States bonds was to be kept with the Comptroller of the Currency ... in
return for which the bank received national bank notes equal to ninety percent,
and later 100 percent, of the value of the deposited bonds; (3) limitations on the
total issue of national bank notes; (4) national banks were allowed to own real estate only if necessary for the transaction of business or acquired through
foreclosure; (5) national banks could be used as depositories for government funds
other than customs duties; (6) banks had to adhere to specific capital requirements
and loan restrictions in order to obtain and retain their charters; and (7) the maintenance of reserve proportional to liabilities.
EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. AND JAMES J. WroTE, BANKING LAW 23 (3rd ed.
BENJAMIN HAGGOTT BECKHART, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 17-19 (1972)

1991). See also
(describing the

basic features of the national banking system).
54. Hugh McCulloch, was the first Comptroller of the Currency. He was president of the
Bank of Indiana and accepted the position of Comptroller after two other men turned it
down. Mr. McCulloch later went on to become the Secretary of the Treasury. Ross M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAISAL 47-48
(1995).
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taining, issuing, and circulating notes according to provisions of
this act...""
This statutory position contrasts sharply with that prevailing in Britain
at the same time.
Despite the increase in U.S. regulation, bank crises continued to occur. Demand deposits had become more widely used yet no dependable
system for turning deposits into cash had developed.5 6 While banks were
required to maintain cash reserves of between 15 to 25 percent of deposits, the system for maintaining reserves functioned poorly during
periods of high demand for cash.57 Moreover, the national currency
proved inelastic, with no ability to respond to variations in the demand
for coin and paper money. Spurred by the banking panic of 1907 and
after much controversy over whether a central bank should be privately
or publicly controlled,"' Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act of
1913.59 President-elect Woodrow Wilson is credited with conceiving a
plan that balanced the need for centralization with the concern of the
agrarians for local control. 60 The stated purpose of the Federal Reserve
Act was: "To provide for the establishment of Federal reserve banks, to
furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial
55. National Banking Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (current version at 12

U.S.C. § 24 (1994)). The current version of this provision has changed little since its original
enactment. For recent discussions of the meaning of this clause, see Julie L. Williams and
James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future-Part11, 52 Bus.
LAW. 1279 (1997); Julie L. Williams and Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783 (1995); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of
Banking" in HistoricalPerspective,51 GEo. WASH. L. REV.676 (1983).
56. See ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 87-88.
57. See SYMONS & WroTE, supra note 53, at 23-24. Symons and White explain the flaw
in the system of maintaining reserves:
Part of these reserves themselves, however, could be kept on deposit in one of the
central reserve cities-New York, Chicago or St. Louis. Funds from other banks
tended to flow to New York, the financial center of the country. New York banks
then loaned these funds to stock-exchange brokers, and so fostered a rise in stock
prices. The resulting boom created a demand for cash by the depositing banks for
their own customers, and the banks sought to obtain cash from their New York reserves. This demand for cash put the New York banks in the position of (1) having
to call in the loans they had made, thus putting pressure on speculators and causing stock prices to fall, or (2) being unable to call in the loans because to do so
would force the stock exchange to close (and so to be unable to remit funds to the
depositing banks).
Id. at 24.

58. See ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 88-90.
59. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
60. ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 89-90. (The central banking system was conceived
with 12 regional federal reserve banks.)
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paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United
States, and for other purposes." 6 Although subject to Congressional
oversight, the Federal Reserve was established as an independent central
bank.6 2 National banks were, and still are, required to become members
of the Federal Reserve System, and were, thus, subject to Federal Reserve regulation and had access to the Fed's check clearing system and
discount window. State banks were not, and still are not, required to
become members,63 and few sought membership.64 After the Federal Reserve Act, national banks were subject to overlapping federal
jurisdiction, which set the stage for strained relations between the OCC
and the Federal Reserve Board.65 In fact, during the early 1920s and apparently incited by the unpopular Comptroller John Skelton Williams,
lawmakers introduced several bills in Congress that would have abolished the OCC and transferred the OCC's authority to the Federal
Reserve Board. None of these bills were successful.66
During this nascent period of bank supervision and monetary control, the number of banks in the United States grew at a rapid rate. The
number of banks in 1865 exploded from 1,532 in 1865 to 27,285 by
1913. In contrast to Britain, the banking system was dominated by unit
banks that were protected from competition as a result of restrictions on
branching by national banks. The unit banking system, combined with
61. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
62. The Federal Reserve is governed by the members of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) without direct control by either the executive or legislative branch. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 225(a) (1994). The activities of the Federal
Reserve are not funded by appropriations but by interest earned on government securities
and income derived from services provided to banks. Board of Governors for the Federal
Reserve, The Structure of the Federal Reserve System: Federal Reserve Banks (visited Oct.
20, 1999) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/frseries/frseri3.htm>.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1994) (any state bank "may make an application" for membership
in the Federal Reserve System). Today access to the Fed's check clearing and lending services is not dependent on a bank's membership in the Federal Reserve System. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 342, 461(b)(7) (1994).
64. By 1921, only 33 per cent of commercial banks were members. PAUL STUDENSKI
AND HERMAN E. KRoos, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 335-36 (2nd ed. 1963).
At the end of 1997, the number of non-member banks still clearly outstripped the number of
member banks: 3,543 of all commercial banks are members of the Federal Reserve System
(2,684 national banks and 1,014 state banks), and 5,560 of all commercial banks are state
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 84TH ANNuAL REPORT, at 306 (1997). Member banks, however, held
significantly more deposits (2,094,630 million), than non-member banks (674,964 million).
Id. at 299.
65. See ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 107-12 (discussing the early relationship between
the two agencies). The relationship between the two agencies still shows signs of strain. See
infra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing the location of non-bank activities).
66. See ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 113-16.
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factors such as low minimum capital requirements for state banks and
the OCC's liberal chartering policies, led to a large number of decentralized banks.67
B. The Great Depression
The U.S. response to the Great Depression solidified its system of
prudential regulation. New Deal reforms, discussed below, established
federal deposit insurance and formalized activities restrictions that remain the law today. Interest rate regulation that was imposed in the
1930s survived until the deregulation of the 1980s and geographic restrictions on banking were not dismantled until the early 1990s. By
contrast, the banking system that was in place in Britain by the end of
the Nineteenth Century survived two world wars and the Great Depression without fundamental change. This meant, above all, that the Bank
of England continued to exercise its informal oversight of the system
without legislative or political interference.
1. Britain Relies On Informal Measures.
Strict hierarchy drove the development of British bank supervision.
At the apex of the system were large clearing banks, dominated by the
"Big Five" 68 with their extensive branch networks. In relation to the
clearing banks, the Bank discharged the functions of a modem central
bank, at the same time remaining in private ownership. The clearing
banks were organized into the Committee of London Clearing Bankers,
and this body acted as a conduit for formal communications between the
Bank's Governor and the clearing banks' chairmen.69 In many respects,
the Bank's relationship with the clearing banks paralleled the relationship between a bank and its most important customers, i.e., the ability to
control was balanced against the financial hegemony wielded by the
67. Today, despite the industry consolidation that has persisted through the 1990s and
the significant bank failures of the 1980s and early 1990s, the number of U.S. banks remains
staggeringly large, especially when compared with other developed countries. In 1997, the
U.S. had 10,923 insured depository institutions (commercial banks and savings associations).
Federal Depository Insurance Corporation, The HistoricalStatistics on Banking (visited Oct.
23, 1999) <http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob>. In contrast, in 1997, Canada had eight "Schedule I"
banks and 43 "Schedule II" banks. 1998 EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 826. Japan had 150 private
commercial banks. Id. at 1891. In 1992, the U.K. had 518 authorized banking institutions,
approximately half of which are branches or subsidiaries of overseas institutions. Id. at 3390.
Despite some obvious potential for mixing apples and oranges in comparing the distinct

categories of institutions in each country, it is apparent that the U.S. distinguishes itself in
sheer numbers of industry participants.
68. The "Big Five" were Barclays, Lloyds' (not to be confused with the Lloyd's of London insurance market), Midland, National Provincial and the Westminster.
69. R. S. SAYERS, Tnm BANK OF ENGLAND 1891-1944, 552 (1976).
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institutions. ° An additional source of control over the banks was provided by the accounting profession which, since the 1879 Companies
Act, had been required to conduct an annual audit of banks' balance
sheets and profit and loss statements' In addition to the clearing banks,
the top tier of the U.K. banking system consisted of a small, elite group
of institutions, i.e., the discount houses and the accepting houses.7 Together with the clearing banks, these institutions represented the core of
the domestic banking system over which the Bank endeavored to exercise a tight grip. The Bank's aim in its role as central bank was to ensure
stability rather than to encourage competition. Therefore, it encouraged
the formation of cartels among both the clearing banks and the discount
houses.73 Institutional linkages between banks and securities dealers and
between banks and insurance companies were actively discouraged, although not prohibited by law or regulation. Informal means were also
used to limit the growth of speculative bubbles in the stock market.74
The Bank conducted its informal supervision of the financial system
primarily through its Discount Office.75 Through the Bank's own market
70. Writing in 1938, one American banker observed of the British system of controlling
banks: "They do it in a different manner in England. They do it voluntarily and with gentlemanly understandings, with harmony and co-operation, while we try to accomplish it here
through law and regulation." WILLIAM T. MCCAFFREY, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN BANKING
SYSTEMS COMPARED 188 (1938).
71.
Corporation procedure in England for a long period of time has placed much reliance in audits on behalf of shareholders by accounting firms. As a result there has
developed a group of reputable and experienced accountants whose audit and certification of the state of the company's affairs carries a high degree of moral
responsibility as well as the reputation for a conservative presentation of the facts.
The customary employment of these firms by the shareholders of these banks is an
assurance to the depositor.
Id. at 33.
72. Like the commercial banks these specialist institutions were also organized into
"Committees" or "Associations" which both facilitated the Bank's quasi-regulatory dealings
with them and which exercised extensive self-regulation. The accepting houses, the City of
London's leading "merchant banks", were organized into the Accepting Houses Committee.
The discount houses were the conduit for the transmission of the Bank's market operations to
the wider financial system. They were organized into the London Discount Market Association.
73. The London Discount Market Association operated a Bank of England sanctioned
cartel in the weekly auction of government bonds. This so-called "syndicated bid" continued
from 1934 until 1971. See, COLLINS, supra note 39, at 220-21.
74. A. Wilfred May, FinancialRegulation Abroad: The Contrasts with American Technique, 47 J. POL. ECON. 493 (1939) ("Except for informal cautioning by the Bank of England
under exceptionally urgent exigencies, British banks and brokers encounter no official interference whatever in their security-loaning operations.").
75. SAYERS, supra note 69, at 272 ("Traditionally it was through the Discount Office
that the Bank expected to sense the need for action, and through the Discount Office that
most of its decisions impinged on the outside world.").
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operations, it was able to influence significantly the activities of all parties involved in the discount market: discount houses, brokers, accepting
houses, and clearing banks. In many cases, the Bank received regular
balance sheet information from these institutions. The Discount Office's
practices set the style for British banking regulation well into the statutory period during the final quarter of the Twentieth Century. This style
was informal, flexible, off-site, and not examination-based.
This style of supervision had fundamental limitations. The Bank
presumed a relationship of trust and confidence between it and the institutions it supervised, and therefore, that all relevant information was
made available to it. Indeed, one bank supervisor likened the Discount
Office to a confessional.76
The fact that the 1930s did not produce significant change in this
peculiar, informal system of banking regulation is noteworthy. 77 Although the first half of the Twentieth Century had witnessed a number
of bank failures in Britain, none were on the scale of those experienced
in the United States.78 When it struck the United Kingdom, the Great
Depression primarily impacted the real rather than the financial economy." Furthermore, there was comparatively little tradition in British
political culture of popular hostility to bankers or to the City. The British Labour party, through which such views might have found
expression, remained out of power throughout the 1930s, and was in any
case committed to the goal of nationalizing industry rather than regulating it.80 These factors combined to ensure that legislative intervention
76. George Blunden, The Supervision of the U.K. Banking System, 15 BANK ENG. Q.
BULL. 188, 189 (June 1975).
77. The failure of the 1930s to result in a more formalized system of bank regulation in
Britain is even more extraordinary when the introduction of legislation in other European
countries is also taken into account. Sweden enacted a law on Credit Institutions in 1934;
Germany in 1934; and Italy in 1936. However, in a number of Continental European countries the Great Depression resulted in serious banking crises that required substantial public
funds to resolve. Legislative change in this period is thus closely connected with the recent
experience of public sector bail-outs of banking systems.
78. The largest bank to have failed in Britain between 1900 and 1930 was Farrow's
Bank, Ltd. in 1920 with 74 branches and £4.1 million in deposits. Of the seven other banks
to fail during this period five were unit banks. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 70 app.
79. However, the Bank of England did become involved in a number of bank rescues
during the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1929 it organized the purchase of the troubled
William Deacon's Bank, which had extensive exposures to the depressed Lancashire cotton
industry, by the Royal Bank of Scotland. See SAYERS, supra note 69, at 253-59. It was also
involved in the rescue of the Anglo-South American bank in 1931 and the accepting house,
Frederick Huth & Co., in the same year. However, these rescues were organized discretely
without the need for public money and did not raise widespread public concern. See id. at
263-71.
80. See ELIZABETH DURBIN, NEW JERUSALEMS 73 (1985) (describing the Labour Party's
economic thinking in the 1930s).
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in the conduct of finance of the sort introduced in the United States in
the wake of the Great Depression did not occur in the United Kingdom
for another four decades.
2. U.S. Banking Industry Under Strain.
During the prosperous 1920s, U.S. banks expanded their commercial lending and securities underwriting" and the banking industry
consolidated. Large banks grew, mergers were common, and branching
spread.82 Still, the prosperity did not inure to all and the Federal Reserve

was unable to stabilize the banking system sufficiently. Bank failures
proliferated during this period, especially among state and nonmember
banks.83
In retrospect, the U.S. banking system seemed almost poised for
collapse once the business boom turned bust; and it did. The country's
financial fortunes began to fade in early 1929 and evaporated with the
stock market crash in October of that year. The economic downturn persisted and worsened for years to come.8 4 Banks suffered the worst
among businesses. During the Great Depression, 5 the number of banks
shriveled from 24,026 on December 31, 1929, to 13,949 on June 30,
193386 as waves of panic swept the country. In the first days of March
1933, and after almost all state governors had issued orders temporarily
closing banks in their respective states, President Roosevelt declared a
nationwide banking "holiday.""

81. Banks conducted their securities activities through affiliates. By 1930, those affili-

ates were underwriting over half of all new securities issues. See
KENNEDY,

SUSAN

ESTABROOK

THE BANKING CRISIS OF 1933, at 212 (1973).

82. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 54, at 100-05 (discussing branch banking).
83. These banks tended to have the least capital, they were subject to less regulation,
and they operated in rural areas that did not benefit from urban prosperity. STUDENSKI &
KRoos, supra note 64, at 334-35.
84. "Instead of short panic, the 1930's featured a deflation and liquidation that became
increasingly severe as time passed. National income dropped from $87.8 billion in 1929 to
$75.7 billion in 1930 and $42.5 billion in 1932." Id. at 353.
85. The U.S. was not alone; the depression was experienced worldwide.
86. See BECKHART, supra note 53, at 258.
87. In a radio address, President Roosevelt commented on contagion fear phenomena of
bank runs:
We had a bad banking situation. Some of our bankers had shown themselves either
incompetent or dishonest in their handling of the people's funds. They had used
the money entrusted to them in speculations and unwise loans. This was of course
not true in the vast majority of our banks but it was true in enough of them to
shock the people for a time into a sense of insecurity and to put them into a frame
of mind where they did not differentiate, but seemed to assume that the acts of a
comparative few had tainted them all. It was the Government's job to straighten
out this situation and do it as quickly as possible-and the job is being performed.
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Legislative reform and the first serious regulation of the banking industry followed. The Banking Act of 193388 ("1933 Act") and the Banking Act
of 193589 ("1935 Act") established the most fundamental, unique, and enduring aspects of U.S. banking regulation. As discussed below, the 1933 Act
established a federal deposit insurance scheme and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") for its administration. The 1933 Act also
included four provisions, commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act
("Glass-Steagall"), which separated the businesses of commercial and investment banking.90 In addition to the creation of federal deposit insurance
and the separation of commercial and investment banking, the 1933 Act and
the 1935 Act incorporated other regulatory controls. Congress raised the
minimum capital requirements for national banks and barred the payment of
interest on demand deposits.
The public interest interpretation is that Congress' primary purpose in
enacting these laws was to create and maintain a more stable financial system. The special interest view is that this legislation was a response to more
base forces, such as a popular dislike for large money center banks, and the
political power of small banks balanced against the political power of the
money center banks. 9,
a.Federal Deposit Insurance
The FDIC was created to protect depositors 92-to the tune of $2,500 per
insured account.93 The notion of deposit insurance was quite
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Radio Address Delivered From The President's Study (March 12,
1933), in PUBLIC ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 43, 47 (DeVorss & Co. 1st
ed. 1934).
88. The Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
89. The Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
90. Section 16 of Glass-Steagall, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994), prohibits a national bank from
most underwriting and restricts national banks' investments in securities; its restrictions are
applicable to state member banks as well. 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1994). Section 21 of GlassSteagall prohibits any firm "engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or
distributing" securities from also engaging in the deposit-taking business. 12 U.S.C. § 378
(1994). Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibits member banks from affiliating with any firm
"engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of
securities. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994). Section 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibits certain management interlocks between member banks and firms "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
91. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 97 (1994).

92. FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 432 (1986) (concluding that
"[c]ongress attempted to safeguard the hard earnings of individuals against the possibility
that bank failures would deprive them of their savings.").
93. Insurance coverage was quickly increased, in 1934 to $5,000. It remained at $5,000
until 1950 when it was doubled to $10,000. In 1966, the ceiling was raised to $15,000; in
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controversial. State deposit insurance programs had been unsuccessful.
Big banks opposed the scheme, because they believed the scheme compelled them to subsidize the operations of weaker banks. President
Roosevelt opposed the scheme for the same reasons. Deposit insurance,
9
94
however, had tremendous appeal with the masses and unit bankers. 9'
Deposit insurance passed, despite the strong opposition, as part of a
compromise that allowed for the larger package of bank reform. In the
end, Roosevelt claimed credit for the deposit insurance scheme "to the
amusement and outrage of contemporary and hindsighted observers." 96
As originally conceived under the 1933 Act and the 1935 Act, all
insured banks were required to be members of the Federal Reserve System. This would have increased the supervisory responsibilities of the
Federal Reserve Board. Non-member banks, however, were able to
bring sufficient political pressure to bear on this issue, so that in 1939,
the membership requirement was dropped from the federal deposit insurance scheme.
The FDIC's operations can be considered successful. During its first
forty-one years (1934-74), the FDIC disbursed $3,536,026 to depositors, but lost only $102,795. 9' Of course, this period was remarkably
stable, averaging only about 13 bank failures per year. 98 The next twenty
years (1975-94), however, present a different picture. During that time,
the FDIC oversaw an average of 78 bank failures a year,99 disbursed
$99,945,147 to depositors, and lost an alarming $36,428,629.' 00 These
statistics quite predictably led to many of the regulatory reforms of the
modem period.'°'

1969 to $20,000; and in 1974 to $40,000. The current $100,000 coverage was established in
1980. 1995 FDIC AN.REP. 110.
94. STUDENSI & KRoos, supra note 64, at 396 ("[T]he FDIC was a tonic to the jaded
psychology of the American public, for it did much to remove the public's distrust of the
banking system.").
95. See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit
Regulatory Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks' Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 19-20 (1995) (arguing that the primary beneficiary of deposit
insurance was the banks). Professors Macey and Miller conclude that the benefits of deposit
insurance to depositors are eroded largely by the lower interest rates banks can pay on insured deposits. See id. at 19.
96. KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 222 (footnote omitted).
97. 1994 FDIC ANN. RaP. 127.
98. See 1994 FDIC ANN. REP. 125. Of the 514 bank failures during this forty-one year
period, 77% occurred during the first ten years. Id.
99. Id.
100. 1994 FDIC ANN. REP. 127.
101. See infra Part II.F.
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b. Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking
The basic intent of the separation of commercial and investment
banking-included in the 1932 Democratic platform-is unclear. 102 The
public interest interpretation of Congress' purpose is the most
conventional view. According to this view, Congress blamed banks'
securities activities for causing the 1929 stock market crash and sought
to prevent history from repeating itself.' 3 Moreover, Glass-Steagall may
represent a public interest oriented law if Congress thought that the
public was better served by banks channeling their resources into the
traditional business of commercial lending.'0 Others argue that GlassSteagall is the product of special interest group pressures. According to
this view, Congress was motivated by investment bankers who were
able to persuade Congress to prohibit commercial banks from competing
against them in the securities business.0 5
While Glass-Steagall's restrictions on banks' securities activities
remain essentially unchanged today, significant changes in agency interpretation of these restrictions have expanded the extent of
banks'
06
1
Depression.
the
following
period
the
since
activities
securities

102. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in FederalBanking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 691-92
(1987) ("Determining who was responsible for the separation of commercial and investment
banking-and why-resembles solving a murder mystery in which all the evidence is circumstantial.").
103. See, e.g., Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1971); ROE, supra note 91, at 95 (1994); KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 212.
104. See Langevoort, supra note 102, at 697. Professor Langevoort argues that "the
principal motivation was pursuit, perhaps more emotional than rational, of the challenging
objective-an attempt to force banks to redirect their resources, efforts, and energies to the
traditional business of commercial and agricultural lending by foreclosing the securities
temptation." As Professor Macey notes, if this was the motivation, it was not rational. See
Jonathan R. Macey, The PoliticalScience of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 OMo ST. L. J. 1277,
1291 n.75 (1989) (arguing that commercial lending and securities underwriting achieve the
same economic purpose, and thus forcing a bank to use one financial vehicle over the other
would not prove beneficial.)
105. See Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial
Function: The Dilemma Of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 15-21 (1984). See also George
J. Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 13 J.
BANK REs. 216, 222 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4, 57-58 (1984); William F. Shugart II, A Public Choice Perspective of the 1933 Banking Act, in TIE FINANCIAL SERVICEs REVOLUTION 87, 98-104
(Catherine England & Thomas Huertas eds., 1988). But see Langevoort, supra note 102, at
692.
106. See infra Part II.F.3 and accompanying text (discussing current restrictions on
banks' securities activities).
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c. Geographic Restrictions
In an amendment to the McFadden Act, the 1933 Act permitted national banks to branch anywhere within a state that permitted state-wide
branching for state banks.' °7 Prior to the passage of the McFadden Act in
1927, national banks did not have the authority to branch.' °8 States,
however, had begun to permit at least some branching within their borders. Like the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress's intent in passing the
McFadden Act and the 1933 amendment is far from clear. Courts interpreting the law have stated that "Congress intended to place national and
state banks on a basis of 'competitive equality' insofar as branch banking was concerned."' 9 It is likely that Congress' intent was more
complex than simply an attempt to level the playing field. The special
interest view is that the McFadden Act was passed to satisfy unit bankers' desire to protect their markets from competitors and to gain their
support for federal deposit insurance."° The public interest interpretation
is that the branching provisions were an attempt, albeit misguided, to
prevent geographic expansion' to promote community reinvestment,
preserve local control, and avoid "undue" concentration." 2 Whatever
their purpose, geographic restrictions on banking continue in the United
States today, although3 in much weaker form than those established in
the 1920s and 1930s."
d. Interest Rate Regulation
The New Deal legislative package also prohibited the payment of
interest on demand deposits and gave the Federal Reserve Board the
authority to regulate interest paid on time deposits. Consistent with the
other major provisions of the New Deal reforms, Congress' intent with
107. The McFadden Act, c. 191, § 2, 44 Stat. 1226 (1927) had permitted national banks
to branch within the limits of the city, town or village in which they were located if state
banks had that power.
108. First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
109. First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261 (1967).
110. Langevoort, supra note 102, at 720-23. See also KENNEDY, supra note 81, at 7
("The McFadden Act of 1927 sought to eliminate any branch banking in the United States,
allegedly to rescue the nation from Eastern aggression.").
I 1. Langevoort, supra note 102, at 720-23.
112. Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73

VA. L. REv. 301, 331 (1987). It is part of American culture to distrust big business. In 1914,
Louis Brandeis wrote of his distrust of big business, particularly big banks. See Louis D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 163-64 (1914) ("[Bloth
the financial concentration and the combinations which they have served were, in the main,
against the public interest. Size, we are told, is not a crime. But size may, at least, become
noxious by reason of the means through which it was attained or the uses to which it is
put.").
113. See infra Part II.F.3 (discussing the IBBEA).
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respect to the interest rate restrictions can be viewed as motivated by the
public interest and/or as service to special interest groups. The public
interest view is that the ability to offer high rates of interest on deposits
had forced banks into riskier investment practices.'" 4 The special interest
view is that large banks sought to limit interest rate competition on demand deposits-their private agreements having been ineffective-and
that this concession was given to them in exchange for their support for
federal deposit insurance." 5
C. Post War Period
The 1930s did not result in significant change to the informal system of bank regulation in Britain. However, in the aftermath of the
Second World War there was a fundamental shift of British economic
philosophy towards a guided or managed economy. The Bank of England was nationalized in 1946, although in practice this did not result in
any significant change in its earlier practices, either with regard to
monetary policy or towards banking regulation. However, the newly
nationalized central bank did begin to play a full role in implementing
the new approach towards economic management. Its authority was not
statutory. It influenced the process of credit creation through its powers
of "moral suasion"-the informal influence resulting from its longstanding relationship with the leading commercial banks. The Bank's
informal control was effective because "only a small group of very large
[clearing] banks was involved, banks with a tradition of acting in unison
and of co-operating with the central bank.... Legislation proved unnecessary, with the authorities appealing to the bankers' sense of public
responsibility."' 1 6 While the Bank was statutorily authorized to issue
formal directives, none were ever issued."' During the immediate postwar period, the Bank focused exclusively on promoting the growth of
credit and the maintenance of orderly markets. Safety and soundness
considerations did not arise in any meaningful sense: the maintenance of
cartel-type arrangements guaranteed profitability, and removed the prospect of serious financial failures among the largest institutions. The
114.

KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION:

ITS PURPOSES,

IMPLEMENTATION, AND

EFFECTS 21 (4th ed. 1994).
115. See Benston, supra note 105, at 228 (explaining that "[a]lthough the FDIC insured
individual deposit accounts only to a maximum of $2,500 ...,assessments were imposed on
a bank's total deposits. Thus the larger banks, that held largely uninsured deposit accounts,
subsidized the small banks ....this cost was almost exactly offset by their savings of interest payments on demand deposits.") (citations omitted).
116. COLLINS, supra note 39, at 479.
117. See Ross CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 128 (1997) (describing the issuance of directives under the 1946 Bank of England Act).
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Bank's primary focus in its supervision of commercial banks was to ensure that they maintained adequate liquidity, rather than adequate
capital. The liquidity ratio-the reserve asset ratio-in turn became a
key instrument for controlling the growth of credit, rather than reflecting
any specifically prudential concern."'
Similarly in the United States, bank safety and soundness was not a
pressing issue during this period. The years after the Depression and
before the S&L crisis of the 1980s proved stable for the banks. There
were very few bank failures"9-a pattern that continued until the
1980s. 2 ° New Deal legislation protected banks from competition among
themselves and from other financial institutions. Legislative efforts
during this period focused primarily on shoring up existing interests
which included the maintenance of a fragmented industry.
Bank holding companies had been in existence for years and concern had grown regarding the use of bank holding companies to avoid
branching restrictions and the consequent increased concentration. The
Bank Holding Company Act of 19562 was designed to restrict the expansion of banking enterprises.'22 The impact of the Bank Holding
Company Act was not as large at the time of its enactment as it would
become in the years to follow. The Bank Holding Company Act would
change the Federal Reserve Board's supervisory role from a minor one,
with responsibilities for only the smallest institutions, state member
banks,'23 to a starring one. While the Bank Holding Company Act closed
a loophole in the federal scheme of geographic restrictions, bank holding companies still emerged as the preferred business form 2 4 and would

118. During this period the Bank of England prescribed a minimum ratio for banks' reserves of liquid assets. The attempt to control bank liquidity reflected the assumption "that
control over commercial banks' reserves of liquid assets would provide control, in turn, over
the general level of their loans and liabilities" and hence of the growth of credit in the economy. COLLINS, supra note 39, at 475. On occasion the Bank also resorted to direct controls
over credit in the form of letters from the Governor to the Chairmen of the Clearing Banks
requesting a reduction or an increase in their lending.
119. From 1934 to 1942, 393 banks failed. See 1995 FDIC ANN. REP. 107.
120. From 1943 to 1981, an average of 5 banks failed per year. See id.
121. May 9, 1956, c. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133.
122. The goals of the act were achieved through three principal proscriptions. First,
bank holding companies were required to register with the Federal Reserve. See 12 U.S.C.
1844(a) (1994). Second, the act restricted geographic expansion through the bank holding
company structure. See 12 U.S.C. 1842(d) (1994). Third, the act limited the activities of bank
holding companies and affiliates (separated the banking business from other businesses). See
12 U.S.C. 1843(c) (1994).
123. Prior to the passage of the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve conducted few bank examinations and generally relied on the OCC's examinations.
124. Because of the eventual loosening of state law restrictions, the bank holding company form because important to the geographic expansion of banks during the 1980s.
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eventually control the vast majority of commercial banks and commercial bank assets. While in 1956, there were only 53 registered holding
companies,12' by the end of 1997, there were 6,102 bank holding companies controlling approximately 7,015 banks, and held 93.8 percent of
all bank assets. 2 6 The extent of the Federal Reserve Board's supervisory
power is directly related to the prevalence of the bank holding company
as the predominant business form in the banking industry.
D. Regulatory Response to Increased Competition
The remarkably stable post-war period in both the United States and
the United Kingdom was undermined during the 1960s by developments
in the relatively unregulated sectors of their respective financial markets.
In the United States, the 1960s began a long story of disintermediation.
Banks began losing commercial loan customers to the commercial paper
market. Banks increased consumer and mortgage lending. These
changes diminished the overall quality of banks' assets.'2 Disintermediation occurred not only on the asset side of banks' balance sheets but
also on the liability side. Soaring oil prices during the 1970s led the
Federal Reserve to drive up interest rates. Depositors seized opportunities to earn higher interest rates offered by money market mutual funds
and withdrew their money from interest rate regulated bank accounts.
The 1970s also saw a marked increase in competition from foreign
banks in the United States.
In Great Britain, the 1960s saw significant growth in banking outside of the sectors controlled by the Bank of England, making its system
of credit control much less effective. Initially the Bank adopted a policy
of benign neglect towards the emergence of the euromarkets and
adopted an accommodating stance toward foreign institutions seeking to
establish branches or subsidiaries in the City. It also displayed little interest in a new breed of "secondary" institutions at the base of the
banking hierarchy. 28However, the emergence of euromarkets provided
the liquidity and wholesale market funds to spur the growth of an unregulated domestic banking sector. This sector, which resided outside
Moreover, the bank holding company form has played an important role in the expansion of
banks' securities activities. See infra Part II.F.3.
125. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES (Jul. 1984), reprintedin Special Supplement No. 1050, Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH), at 20 (Nov. 16, 1984).
126. See 1997 BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys. ANN.REP. 217.
127. See BECKHART, supra note 53, at 346.
128. These "Secondary" or "fringe" banks were banks that were recognized under Section 123 of the Companies Act; however, they were not subject to authorization or
supervision by any public body. See supra note 47 (describing secondary banks).
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the Bank's traditional sphere of influence, or indeed interest, was nonetheless to provide the source of the explosive credit growth which lead
to the United Kingdom's most serious banking crisis of this century.
The immediate regulatory response in both the United States and the
United Kingdom to these market developments was deregulation. The
deregulatory efforts of this period, however, did not necessarily result in
less formal regulatory regimes. In Britain, dismantling the post-war
system of credit control in favor of a system which gave market forces a
greater role in credit allocation was balanced by the impact of the Secondary Banking Crisis, which forced the Bank into a formalized statutebased system of safety and soundness regulation. Similarly in the United
States, while significant deregulation has been achieved during the last
twenty years, its regulatory regime remains the most comprehensive and
formal in the world.
1. United Kingdom's Interregnum: 1970s
The Bank of England responded to the growth of the secondary
banking sector and the emerging presence of foreign institutions by deregulating the U.K.'s domestic financial markets. Increased competition
was the purpose of the Competition and Credit Control (CCC) system
introduced in September 197129 The CCC regime was implemented
administratively, without the need for legislative authorization, although
it enjoyed the full support of the then Conservative government. The
new regime placed increased reliance on manipulating interest rates to
regulate credit, as opposed to the more quantitative techniques employed
in the past. The CCC regime was not, however, entirely deregulatory.
Under the new regime, a wider range of banks were obliged to comply
with the Bank's monetary and credit controls. Significantly, this extended the reserve asset ratio to all "statistical" banks, requiring them
to maintain interest free reserves, a specified ratio of their Sterling deposits, with the Bank.

129. The Governor of the Bank described it as "a new approach to credit control designed to permit the price mechanism to function efficiently in the allocation of credit, and to
free banks from their rigidities and restraints which have for far too long inhibited them from
efficiently fulfilling their intermediary role in the financial system." COLLINS, supra note 39,
at 490.
130. The statistical banks were those from which the Bank collected regular statistical
reports, especially balance sheet data and the currency composition of their lending. The
provision of this information was purely voluntary. By late 1973 there were 323 banks listed
by the Bank of England as the contributors to the published banking statistics. In addition,
there were 133 companies holding section 123 certificates that were carrying on banking
businesses. By definition, the latter were outside the scope of the Bank's statistical reporting
system. See MARGARET REm, THE SEcONDARY BANKING CRIsis 1973-75, at 51 (1982).
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The extension of its reserve asset ratio to all statistical banks was
part of the Bank's attempt to assert its control over new parts of the
banking sector and to reduce incentives for arbitrage. The Bank's efforts, however, were too little too late. As a result of deregulation and
the Conservative government's loose fiscal and monetary policies, Sterling bank lending rose significantly.' While the statistical banking
sector accounted for a significant proportion of the increase, unregulated
secondary banks made a major contribution.' When the inflationary
bubble burst, secondary banks were left heavily exposed to a real estate
sector which was unable to meet its repayment obligations. A number of
institutions faced serious liquidity problems, and as the crisis wore on a
growing number of them became insolvent.
The Bank of England was forced to launch a "lifeboat," a rescue
package for troubled secondary banks. The Bank, along with London
and Scottish clearing banks, contributed its own resources to the lifeboat.'33 Although the lifeboat was originally intended to provide
liquidity to solvent secondary banks, eventually lifeboat funds were
used to bail out depositors of insolvent institutions. While the lifeboat
was successful in preserving the stability of the banking system and effectively insured secondary banks' deposits, the Secondary Banking
Crisis represented the last occasion on which the Bank was able to mobilize the City "club" to act in for a collective good.3 Moreover, the
lifeboat was the last occasion on which the Bank was able to take charge
of a major crisis without some attempt by the government to exert oversight and control.
The Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973-74 spurred the development
of statute-based bank regulation. The crisis also resulted in some immediate and significant changes in the Bank's methods of supervision.
While the Bank's then Governor, Gordon Richardson, publicly singled
out the secondary banks for special blame in the crisis, a number of statistical banks had engaged in similarly poor banking practices.
Confidence needed to be restored in both the City and the Bank by highprofile action.
131. The first year after the introduction of the CCC sterling bank lending rose 70%.
Two years into the new regime lending rose 145%. Property lending rose 250%. See id. at

60.
132. See supra note 47 (describing secondary banks).
133. By mid-summer of 1974, the Bank and the clearing banks had comnmitted £1,200
million to the lifeboat operation, a sum which amounted to 40% of the combined reserves of
the London and Scottish clearing banks. See REiD,supra note 130, at 137.
134. The clearing banks reluctance, twenty years later, to take part, in a bail-out package for Barings was a major factor in the Bank's decision to allow the institution to fail. See
infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (discussing the Barings scandal).
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The Bank took immediate steps to improve its supervisory practices.
It created a new Banking and Money Markets Supervision Division
(BAMMS) to replace the supervisory functions previously discharged
by the Discount Office.'35 By 1978, BAMMS had a staff of seventy,
nearly five times the staff of the former Discount Office.
Along with organizational changes came changes to the Bank's supervisory practices. The Bank's past supervision had placed particular
emphasis on the liquidity ratios of clearing banks and accepting houses.
While continuing to monitor liquidity closely, BAMMS began to place
a new emphasis on capital ratios. BAMMS also extended the range of
information it collected and the scope of the institutions from which it
gathered information. All British registered banks, which included all
British owned banks and subsidiaries of foreign banks, but not their
U.K. branches, were requested to submit additional quarterly returns.
These returns provided BAMMS with much more detailed information
than had been available to the Discount Office.
In retrospect, the 1970s can be seen as an interregnum in the history
of British bank regulation. On the one hand, much of the old system of
direct credit controls was dismantled, in theory allowing more competition. The Bank abandoned its past support for cartel arrangements
involving U.K. financial institutions. On the other hand, the Bank of
England continued to operate through its traditional and informal approach of moral suasion. While the Bank sought to develop its
regulatory capacity and expertise, and importantly took a leading international leadership role as chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking
and Regulation and Supervisory Practices,'36 the Bank did so without
formal statutory authority. This was an inherently unstable position, and
subsequently proved so.
2. United States Adjusts New Deal Constraints: 1980s
Deregulation was a popular cry in the 1980s and perhaps loudest
from the banking world. Congress responded with the passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
("DIDMCA")' 37 Congress based the passage of DIDMCA on the finding that regulated interest rates were not beneficial to depositors or
banks.'38 The legislation called for the phase out of interest rate ceilings

135. See REm, supra note 130, at 196.
136. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, supra note 1.
137. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
138. Specifically, DIDA sets forth Congress's finding that:
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and established the Depository Institutions Deregulation Committee
("DIDC") to implement the phase out." 9 This eventually led to the complete phase out of interest rate regulation on deposit accounts, except for
business checking accounts.10 The DIDMCA also required all banks,
both members
and nonmembers, to maintain reserves with the Federal
41
Reserve.1

The DIDMCA also eliminated many restrictions on the activities of
federally chartered thrifts. It authorized thrifts to make commercial real
estate loans, secured and unsecured consumer loans, to issue credit
cards, and invest up to 20% of their assets in commercial paper and corporate debt. The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982142
expanded thrift powers even further, allowing for thrifts to make commercial loans and accept commercial deposits.
While U.S. banks sought deregulation of their own activities, they
also sought to curtail the competitive advantage of the growing number
of foreign banks operating in the United States. Concurrently, U.S.
regulators became anxious about the lack of supervision over the U.S.

(1) limitations on the interest rates which are payable on deposits and accounts
discourage persons from saving money, create inequities for depositors, impede
the ability of depository institutions to compete for funds, and have not achieved
their purpose of providing an even flow of funds for home mortgage lending; and
(2) all depositors, and particularly those with modest savings, are entitled to receive a market rate of return on their savings as soon as it is economically feasible
for depository institutions to pay such rate.
12 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (West 1989) (expired in 1986).
139. The members of the DIDC were the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the
Chairman of the FDIC, and Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Chairman
of the Credit Union Administration Board, and the Comptroller (as a non-voting member).
See Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142
(codified as amended as 12 U.S.C. § 3509 and expired in 1986)
140. Banks have avoided restrictions on the payment of interest on business checking
accounts by offering sweep accounts which move idol funds out of checking accounts and
into interest bearing deposit accounts. Congress has considered two bills which would allow
the payment of interest on business checking accounts. See Financial Regulatory Relief and
Economic Efficiency Act of 1997, S. 1405, 105th Cong.; Depository Institution Regulatory
Streamlining Act of 1998, H.R. 4364, 105th Cong.
141. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1994). Mark Toma explains:
State banking regulations ... became progressively less stringent compared with
Fed reserve requirement regulations. As a result, the Fed experienced a steady
membership decline during the 1960s and 1970s. Continuation of this trend threatened to force the Federal Reserve out of the reserve requirement regulatory
market. Partially in reaction to this threat, Congress passed [DIDMCA].
Mark Toma, The Role of the Federal Reserve in Reserve Requirement Regulation, in TIM
FINANCIAL SERVICEs REVOLUTION, supra note 105, at 224.
142. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469.
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operations of foreign banks. Congress responded to these concerns by
passing the International Banking Act of 1978 ("IBA"),143 which imposed many of the same regulatory restrictions on foreign banks as on
domestic ones. The IBA was based on the principle of "parity of treatment" between domestic and foreign banks.'" In effect, the IBA closed
loopholes that had allowed foreign banks operating in the United States
to avoid restrictions on bank holding company activities, Glass-Steagall
Act restrictions on securities activities, and interstate banking restrictions.145 Significantly, Congress did not respond to the increase of
foreign bank competition with deregulation. The IBA could be seen as
protectionist in the sense that it imposed new restrictions on foreign
banks. On the other hand, Congress could have imposed stricter requirements on foreign banks operating in the United States but chose
not to in an attempt to encourage other foreign
nations to treat U.S.
46
banks operating abroad in a similar fashion.
Increased international lending by domestic banks, coupled with a
mounting debt crisis, was the impetus for the passage of the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 ("ILSA"). 41 ILSA, among other
things, requires banks to maintain special reserves against certain international loans. 48 Significantly, the ILSA contained the first statutory
capital requirements. It directed the federal banking agencies to require
banks "to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital."'' 49 Congress also signaled its desire for
international convergence of capital standards by directing the banking
agencies to "consult with the banking supervisory authorities of other
countries to reach understandings aimed at achieving the adoption of
effective and consistent supervisory policies and practices with respect
to international lending."' 5 Congress' exhortation would be answered by
a joint initiative between the United States and United Kingdom and
later by the Basel Accord.''

143. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607.
144. S. REP.No. 95-1073, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1421, 1422.
145. See generally John L. Carr, Jr. and John H. More, Developments in the Regulation
of Foreign Bank Operations in the United States, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv.225.
146. See Stanley F. Farrar et al., Choice of Home State Under the International Banking
Act of 1978, 1980 U. ILL. L. REV.91, 95-96.
147. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278. (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
148. 12 U.S.C. § 3904 (1994).
149. 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (1994).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 3901(b) (1994).
151. See infra Part II.F.2.

Summer 1999]

Convergence and Competition

E. United Kingdom Adopts Statute Based System
The Bank of England's informal system of banking supervision,
which had matured during the 1930s and continued with only modest
change during the immediate post-war period, could not survive the
Secondary Banking Crisis. The fall out from the Secondary Banking
Crisis made legislation inevitable despite the Bank of England's preference for the status quo. Nonetheless, the Bank of England's experience
as a statutory regulator was shaped by the informal and institutionspecific nature of its pre-statutory supervision. In many respects, the
history of the Bank's role as statutory regulator can be characterized as
an attempt to reconcile a set of assumptions, a culture, and a strategy
that it had inherited from its pre-statutory role to the demands of a statute-based system. The Bank never successfully reconciled these
different demands.
1. Banking Act of 1979
The Secondary Banking Crisis highlighted four major deficiencies
in the informal system of regulation. First, considerable ••
public
confu152
sion existed regarding the status of banking recognitions. Second,
many depository institutions were completely unsupervised. Third, no
formal arrangements existed to protect depositors of failed institutions.
Finally, even where the Bank did play a supervisory role, its efforts
were not wholly effective.
Concurrent with the United Kingdom's reexamination of its system
for bank supervision, European Union law became an important consideration. In December of 1977, the European Economic Community
("EEC") adopted its first Council Directive "on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up
and pursuit of the business of credit institution." This became known at
the first Banking Coordination Directive ("IBCD")."' The 1BCD was
concerned with the authorization of "credit institutions," which it defined as institutions that engage in both deposit taking and lending. The
directive set forth five minimum conditions for the authorization of a
152. In the late 1960s it was customary for the Bank to refer to a hierarchy of banking
recognitions. The clearing banks, accepting houses, and discount houses were considered to
be at the apex of the banking hierarchy. Numerous other designations and statutory authori-

zations existed below this top tier. Slightly below the top rung of the banking ladder were the
Section 127 banks that were exempt from the provisions of the Protection of Depositors Act
of 1963. Further down the ladder was the Section 54 recognition that authorized an institution to pay annual interest on deposit accounts. The bottom rung of the ladder was occupied
by institutions granted a certificate issued by the Department of Trade (now the Department
of Trade and Industry) under Section 123 of the Companies Act of 1967.
153. Council Directive 77/780/EEC, 1977 O.J. (L 322) 30.
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credit institution. 5 4 The directive additionally called for the establishment of common prudential ratios, but the EEC countries could not
agree on these for many years to come.'55 In the shorter term, the United
Kingdom was now obliged to implement a formal system of bank licensing and regulation for the first time in one hundred and fifty years.
The Bank of England inherited statute-based supervision as a natural
extension of its traditional role. While U.K. lawmakers gave some consideration to granting bank supervisory powers to a new commission or
to the Department of Trade, 5 6 the Bank's Governor Richardson successfully lobbied in Whitehall for the Bank to take on the statute-based
supervisory role. Governor Richardson had important influence over the
substance of the new law as well. He suggested that the real defect in the
current system was the lack of a clear distinction between the primary
and secondary banking sectors. He insisted that there was no need to
interfere with the Bank's relationship with the primary sector. The new
legislation, the Banking Act of 1979, included a two tier system of
banking supervision. The law drew a distinction between "recognized
banks" and "licensed deposit takers" ("LDT").'57 While Richardson
would have preferred a system that imposed no statutory oversight on
the recognized banks, 1BCD applied its minimum criteria to all banks.
Schedule 2 of the Banking Act of 1979 reflects this tension. While some
of its criteria apply to both recognized banks and licensed deposit takers,
there are important differentiations. Both types of institutions must employ at least two individuals to "effectively direct" its business, and both
types of institutions must conduct their business in a prudent manner.
On the other hand, the minimum capital required for an LDT was set at
154. (1) the credit institution must possess separate own funds; (2) it must possess adequate minimum own funds; (3) there shall be at least two persons who effectively direct the
institution's business; (4) those persons must be of "sufficiently good repute" and have sufficient experience" to perform their duties; (5) applications for authorization must be
accompanied by a "programme of operations" setting out, inter alia, the types of business
envisaged and the structural organization of the institution. Id. at 33.
155. See infra Part II.F.2.
156. Both the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer had their doubts about
whether the Bank was the right institution to conduct banking regulation, and even some
figures with the Bank itself had similar reservations. See MICHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF
BANKING 120 (2d ed., 1986); STEPHEN FAY, PORTRAIT OF AN OLD LADY, 90 (1987).
157. Two criteria served to distinguish recognized banks from LDTs. First, a recognized bank had to provide either "a wide range of banking services" or "a highly specialized
banking service." The latter was not defined by the Act, leaving its interpretation to the discretion of the Bank. "A wide range of banking services" was defined as deposit taking,
lending, foreign exchange, trade finance, and financial advice. Banking Act 1979, ch. 37,
sched. 2, para. 2(2) (Eng.). Second, a recognized bank was one which "enjoys, and has for a
reasonable period of time enjoyed, a high reputation and standing in the financial community." Id. para. I(1). The act did not define this standard, leaving substantial discretion to the
Bank in its interpretation.
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£250,000, whereas for a recognized bank it was £5 million. Moreover,
many of the criteria applied to LDTs were more specific, although not
necessarily more onerous, than those applied to the recognized banks. 58'
Significantly, the 1979 act provided the Bank with the power to require
the production of information only from LDTs, but not from recognized
banks.
In these respects, the 1979 Act perpetuated the Bank's established
practice rather than requiring any significant break with the past. The
distinction between recognized banks and LDTs had been constructed to
permit the Bank to continue its non-statute based form of supervision.
Unlike many continental European banking statutes, the 1979 Act made
no attempt to lay down detailed and rigid capital and liquidity requirements. This enabled the Bank to continue to apply the flexible, case-bycase approach it had followed since the days of supervision by the Discount Office.
The 1979 Act, however, did more than establish authorization requirements and grant the Bank chartering and supervisory authority. The
new law also reflected important influence from the Labour party, which
had controlled the government since February 1974. Consumer protection had strong appeal within Labour and the proposed banking law
acquired some of the trappings of consumer legislation, in part to ensure
that the government would award it sufficient parliamentary time to ensure its passage. ' In place of the unsatisfactory ad hoc arrangement
adopted during the Secondary Banking Crisis, the 1979 Act established
a Deposit Protection Scheme. The U.K.'s deposit insurance differed significantly from the system developed in the United States more than 40
years earlier. The Deposit Protection Scheme included no access to taxpayer money but was funded solely by a levy on the banking industry.
The Deposit Protection Fund ("DPF") was created to lend credibility to
the scheme. The deposit protection afforded by the fund was only for a
relatively small amount: 75% of a maximum of £10,000 of an
158. A recognized bank was required to maintain "net assets which together with other
financial resources available to the institution of such nature and amount as are considered
appropriate by the Bank, are of an amount which is commensurate with the scale of the institution's operations." Id. para. 6. In the case of a LDT, however, the net assets had to be
"sufficient to safeguard the interest of its depositors," having regard to "the scale and nature

of the liabilities of the institution and the sources and amounts of deposits accepted by it"
and to "the nature of its assets and the degree of risk attached to them." Id. para. 10. Similarly, the management criterion was more specific for LDTs than for recognized banks. The
management of recognized banks was required to carry on business with "integrity and prudence" and with "those professional skills which are consistent with the range and scale of
the institution's activities." Id. para. 3. In contrast, the management of LDT has to be "a fit
and proper person to hold that position." Id. para. 7.
159. See MORAN, supra note 156, at 121.
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institution's sterling liability to an individual depositor.16 The relatively
low coverage was intended to protect "small"
depositors and the 75%
6
cap provided some level of co-insurance.1 1
With regard to the Bank's supervisory role, the 1979 Act imposed
on the Bank a statutory duty to "protect the interests of depositors." This
was not necessarily consistent with the Bank's traditional central bank
role in which its primary concern was systemic failure. The Bank's reluctance to acknowledge the implications of this new statutory duty
resurfaced in the years to come.162
2. Banking Act of 1987
The first major challenge to the Bank's traditional style of supervision was the rescue of Johnson Matthey Bankers ("JMB") in 1984.163
JMB, a subsidiary of Johnson Matthey gold refiners, was one of the five
London gold-dealing banks. It was a recognized bank under the 197964
Act. As an institution considered of "high reputation and standing,"
JMB was subject to little supervision. JMB's problems arose when it
grafted a rapidly growing lending business onto its gold-dealing activities. In the four and a half years prior to September 1984, JMB's loan
portfolio grew from £34 million to £450 million, with one-third of the
increase occurring in the last six months of the period. JMB's lending
was also highly concentrated, with two customers borrowing sums
amounting to 65% and 34% of the bank's capital, respectively. On September 25, 1984, JMB's accountants recommended additional loan loss
provisions that would have virtually wiped out JMB's capital.
The Bank of England did not detect JMB's imprudent lending practices until too late. Among the reasons for this failure were that the Bank
staff was seriously overextended and that JMB submitted late and misleading quarterly returns to the Bank. Most importantly, however, was
160. In contrast, since 1980, U.S. deposit insurance has covered $100,000 in deposits
without a co-insurance provision. See 1995 FDIC ANN.REP. 110.
161. The DPF was controversial. The Committee of London Clearing Bankers criticized
the proposal because of the moral hazard created. The industry levy was also criticized for
failing to distinguish between institutions' differing degrees of insolvency risk. See JOHN
GRADY & MARTIN WEALE, BRITISH BANKING 1960-1985, at 43 (1986).
162. In February 1997-a matter of months before the Bank was stripped of its supervisory powers-it was still struggling to reconcile these conflicting objectives. See Michael
Taylor, "Strengthening, but not Ensuring, the Protection of Depositors": the Bank of England on the Objectives of Supervision, 12 BUTTERWORTHS J. IT.'L BANING & FIN. L. 151,
151 (1997).
163. For comprehensive accounts of the JMB rescue, see generally FAY, supra note 156;
MARGARET REID, ALL-CHANGE IN THE CITY (1988).
164. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (describing classification and supervision of recognized banks).
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the Bank's overall trust in recognized banks. "Its practice had been to
rely on the accuracy of their statistical returns, and to encourage bankers
to bring their troubles to the attention of the Bank. In the case of JMB,
this practice proved inadequate."' 65
Although JMB was not a significant bank and might have been allowed to fail, the Bank did not wish to risk serious instability in the gold
market given JMB's numerous dealings with other gold banks. Therefore, the Bank purchased JMB for £1 after its parent company, Johnson
Matthey, agreed to inject £50 million of capital. The Bank installed new
management, under the chairmanship of one of its own directors. New
managers immediately increased loan loss provisions by £254 million.
The JMB rescue had a number of important implications for the
Bank. First, the Bank had been unable to rally support from the clearing
banks as it had done in the past. 66 Second, the episode exposed the Bank
to a level of public scrutiny it had not previously encountered. ' 67 As a
result, a committee was established to study the system of bank regulation and its recommendations were subsequently incorporated in the
Banking Act of 1987. The committee, which came to be known as the
Leigh-Pemberton committee, was far from impartial. It was chaired by
Bank Governor Leigh-Pemberton and included both the Deputy Gover6
1
nor and the Associate Director responsible for banking supervision.1
The Leigh-Pemberton committee's most important recommendation
was to abolish the two-tier system. The 1987 Act thus replaced the recognized banks/LDT distinction with a single category of "authorised
institution" subject to statutory criteria set forth in Schedule 3 of the
Act: Directors, controllers, and managers must be "fit and proper;" the
board of directors must consist of an appropriate number of
165. FAY, supra note 156, at 150.
166. In sharp contrast to its experience in the lifeboat operation ten years earlier, see
supra Part II.D.1, the clearing banks reluctantly contributed only £34 million of the £150
million required in the bailout. One clearing banker objected to being asked to take a share
of the costs for an episode that he blamed on the Bank's failed supervision. See REmD, supra
note 163, at 227.
167. Treasury ministers allowed it to be known that they had major reservations regarding the Bank's handling of the affair. This was an unprecedented airing of differences
between the finance ministry and the central bank. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel
Lawson, went even further in a statement to the House of Commons, when he concluded that
the Bank's supervisors "did to some extent fall down on the job." While the words are measured, this was considered an unmistakable rebuke. Other parliamentarians were less
restrained, with one Opposition backbencher describing Governor Leigh-Pemberton as a
"useless deadbeat." REm, supra note 163, at 229, 232.
168. The secretary of the committee was also a Bank official. Two other members of
the committee were Treasury officials. The director of Barclays was the sole "independent"
member. Report of the Committee Set Up to Consider the System of Banking Supervision,
HMSO,Cmnd. 9550, June 1985 [hereinafter Leigh-Pemberton Report].
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non-executives; the institution's business must be governed with
"integrity and skill" and "in a prudent manner."16 9 The new Schedule 3
was more precise than the 1979 Act with regard to the "general prudent
conduct" criterion. It included a requirement that an institution maintain
"own funds" that were "commensurate with the nature and scale of
the
institution's operations" and that took into account the "risks inherent in
[the institution's] operations," or those of any other undertaking in the
same group that might affect the institution. 70° An authorized institution
was also required to maintain adequate liquidity, make adequate provision for bad and doubtful debts, and maintain adequate accounting
records and systems of control.
The Leigh-Pemberton committee also recommended explicit limits
on large exposures. This recommendation was incorporated as Section
38 of the 1987 Act, which required the reporting of all transactions with
a single borrower or group of closely related borrowers that in the aggregate amounted to more than 10% of an institution's capital.' 7'
Although the failure to make a report to the Bank was made a criminal
offense, the Act did not grant the Bank the power to prevent an
authorized institution from entering into a large exposure once the report
had been made.17 The Bank could, however, determine that a loan transaction violates the "prudent conduct" criterion of authorization.
Section 39 of the 1987 Act granted the Bank the power to obtain information and require the production of documents from all authorized
institutions. 4 In particular, Section 39 empowered the Bank to instruct
an authorized institution to provide it with a report from "an accountant
or other person with relevant professional skill." These "Section 39"
reports were intended as a compromise between the Bank's traditional
style of supervision and an examination-based system,'75 like that of the

169. Banking Act, 1987, c.22, Sch. 3, para. 1-6.
170. Banking Act 1987, Sch. 3, para. 4(2) and para. 4(3).
171. Section 38 of the Banking Act also required the authorized institution to make a
report to the Bank if it proposed entering into a transaction which "would result in its being
exposed to the risk of incurring losses in excess of 25 per cent of those resources." Banking
Act 1987, ch. 22, § 38(1)(b) (Eng.).
172. Id. at § 38(9).
173. In contrast, the U.S.'s National Bank Act provides that loans by national banks
"shall not exceed 15 per centum of the unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus" of the
bank. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1)(1994) (emphasis added).
174. Prior to 1987, the Bank had this type of formal authority only with respect to the
LDTs. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
175. The Leigh-Pemberton committee recommended also that Bank supervisors increase their visits to authorized institutions to "broaden their knowledge of banks'
managements and to help in the assessment of their control systems." Leigh-Pemberton
Committee Report, supra note 168, at 13.17. These visits, however, were not intended to
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United States. This solution essentially privatized the examination process, putting it in the76hands of accounting firms who were usually also
the bank's auditors.1
The Leigh-Pemberton committee also made recommendations regarding the staffing and ethos of the Bank's Banking Supervision
Division. The committee's report recommended staff increases and the
recruitment of supervision experts as opposed to the generalists who had
staffed the Supervision Division in the past." 7 The Bank, however,
struggled both to create this cadre of specialists and to accord bank supervision prestige equal to that of monetary policy making."7 '
Beyond the recommendations of the Leigh-Pemberton committee,
the 1987 Act created the Board of Banking Supervision, which had the
responsibility for overseeing the Bank's execution of its supervisory
duties and to provide consultation in difficult cases. The Bank could
reject the Board's advice, but in that event it was required to inform the
Chancellor of the Exchequer. In theory, the Board served a useful oversight function, but in practice the Board had limited knowledge of the
activities of the Supervision Division. 179
The 1987 Act was unusual in its specific proscriptions. In general,
however, the Act continued to grant the Bank substantial supervisory
discretion. For example, the "prudent conduct" criterion was intended to
allow flexible interpretation.8 0 The Bank provided some interpretation
of these requirements in its Statements of Principles and various policy
notices it issued beginning in the 1980s. The extensive supervisory discretion not only essentially precluded legal challenge to its rulemaking,
but it also enabled the Bank to maintain the flexible and institutionspecific approach to supervision on which it rested so much pride.
constitute examinations but were to be used "to assess a wider range of the bank's management team and to consider in greater detail the design of the control systems." Id. at 6.2.
176. The conflict of interest inherent in this dual role was never satisfactorily resolved,
or even thoroughly examined.
177. Leigh-Pemberton Report, supra note 168, at 19.3.
178. In his memoirs, Nigel Lawson, former Chancellor of the Exchequer, observed that
"despite the Bank's subordinate role in monetary policy [since decisions were made by the
Chancellor] and its leading role in bank supervision, the high fliers were all attracted to the
former, much sexier side, while the humdrum but important bank supervision side was always in danger of becoming something of a backwater." NIGEL LAWSON, THE VIEW FROM
No. 11, at 406 (1992).
179. See infra Part II.F.I (discussing reports on BCCI and Barings).

180. The U.K.'s "prudent conduct" criterion can be compared to the U.S.'s general prohibition of "unsafe or unsound practice." See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1994). Of course, the
U.S.'s "unsafe or unsound practice" standard is linked to a complex enforcement scheme that
has no parallel in the British system. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary
Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175, 202-10 (1995).
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F. Modern Transitions
In recent years, the United States has continued on a course of incremental deregulation that began in 1980. 81' At the same time, the
United States has enhanced its relatively formidable regulatory powers
over banks and their officers and directors in response to the S&L scandal and other banking crises. Moreover, the United States has continued
to struggle with the tension and overlap that exists among the numerous
federal and state agencies responsible for bank regulation. While important proposals to consolidate or restructure agency responsibilities
have been made, more serious legislative attention has always been
given to passage of laws that impact more directly on the crisis or new
competitor of the day.
During the last decade, the Bank of England's supervisory backbone
has been tested by two high profile international banking crises. Moreover, the Bank of England's resolve to remain a flexible supervisoravoiding rigid supervisory standards-was undermined by the rise of
European Union law. Ultimately, the Bank's ambivalence toward bank
supervision was answered in 1998 with the transfer of that responsibility
to a new regulator, the Financial Services Authority.
1. Continued Crisis Management
While lacking the dramatic numbers involved in the bank failures of
the Great Depression, the U.S. bank and savings and loan failures of the
1980s and 1990s were notorious. From 1980 to 1994, over 1,600 FDICinsured banks were closed or received financial assistance from the
FDIC."s2 An analysis of the causes of the banking crisis of the 1980s and
1990s is beyond the scope of this Article, 83 but certainly one factor was
the increased competition from within the banking industry and from
non-bank competitors that led banks to engage in more speculative activities such as commercial real estate lending. Of course, some of the
increased competition was the result of the deregulatory efforts of the
early 1980s. ' Regional economic recessions contributed to bank failures, especially given the geographic restrictions that were still in place
during the 1980s. Finally, management inattention.and misconduct has
also shared the blame for the crisis.
181. See infra Part II.D.
182. FDIC, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTtES, LESSONS FOR THE FuTURE: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s 3 (Vol. 1, 1997). The number of savings association failures during this period was equally dismal-1,300 failed. Id. at 4 n. I.
183. For a detailed discussion of the causes of banking failures, see id. at 3-38.
184. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing DIDMCA and Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982).
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In response, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").' 85 The primary
purpose of this legislation was to rescue the thrift federal deposit insurance fund, but FIRREA went much further. It granted the FDIC and the
other federal bank regulators greater enforcement powers and created the
Office of Thrift Supervision, the federal thrift regulator. FIRREA expanded the federal banking regulators' power to impose civil money
penalties-potentially as high as one million dollars for each day that
the violation continues. 8 6 It made enforcement available against
"institution affiliated parties," which include bank directors, officers,
shareholders, attorneys, and accountants.' 87 FIRREA also reversed the
long running practice of confidentiality by requiring cease and desist
orders issued by the federal banking regulators to be made public.'88
Armed with new statutory powers, the federal agencies stepped up
their enforcement activities against banks and their officers and directors. The FDIC, acting as receiver for failed institutions, began an
aggressive campaign to restore funds lost by the bank insurance fund.
Suits brought against officers and directors of failed banks and thrifts
drew particular attention and criticism. In litigation, the FDIC went so
far as to assert a broad federal policy against depletion of the deposit
insurance fund. The Supreme Court rejected that principle, stating simply that "there is no federal policy that the fund should always win.' 89
The United Kingdom experienced nothing comparable to the bank
and savings and loan crises in the States, but the United Kingdom has
had its share of high-profile crises in the last decade. The closure of the
Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI") on July 5, 1991
came after many years of suspicion regarding its activities. While the
Bank had shared those suspicions, it was blamed for its lack of inquisitiveness. The Bank insisted in its defense that it lacked sufficient
evidence to revoke the institution's authorization. An independent investigation of the matter, chaired by Sir Thomas Bingham, concluded
otherwise. The Bingham report concluded that the Bank had the power
it needed but was reluctant to use it. Writing on the BCCI episode before the publication of the Bingham report, Nigel Lawson, former
Chancellor of the Exchequer and chief architect of the 1987 Act, observed that

185. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
186. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (1994).
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(u) (1994).
188. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (1994)
189. O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994).
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[The Bank] had never fully come to terms with the task of taking tough supervisory decisions within a statutory
framework .... [O]n a number of occasions during my time... I
found the Bank fearful of taking a particular course of action
because of a misplaced fear of being successfully taken to court
if it did. 90
The Bingham report did not include a recommendation for new legislation. Instead, the report concluded that the Bank's overall style of
supervision should remain unchanged, but that a different approach
should be used with an institution that failed to be open and cooperative
with its supervisor. Thus, a Special Investigations Unit, staffed by fraud
and audit specialists, was added to the Banking Supervision Division.
The BCCI scandal had an impact in the United States as well.' 9'
Congress responded, some argue overreacted, 92 with the passage of the93
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 ("FBSEA"),1
which was implemented by the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation
K. 194 The FBSEA requires Federal Reserve Board approval for the establishment of a branch, agency or commercial lending company by a
foreign bank.' 95 The Federal Reserve Board may not approve such application unless it determines that the foreign bank "is subject to
comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the
appropriate authorities in its home country" and the foreign bank has
provided the Federal Reserve Board with the information needed to assess the application.' 96

190. LAwsoN, supra note 178, at 410. While U.S. agencies have been subjected to their
share of criticism, one would likely be hard-pressed to find anyone critical of the agencies'
willingness to test the bounds of statutory interpretation.
191. See generally RAI K. BHALA, FOREIGN BANK REGULATION AFTER BCCI (1994);
William B. Glidden, The Regulation of U.S. Bank's Operations Abroad, 108 BANKING L.J.
108 (1991); Daniel M. Laifer, Putting the Super Back in the Supervision of International
Banking, Post-BCCI,60 FORDHAM L. REv. S467 (1992).
192. See BHALA, supra note 191, at xxii.

193. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2286 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.).
194. 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1999).
195. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d) (1994).
196. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2) (1994). Also in response to the BCCI scandal, the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision adopted, in July of 1992, Minimum Standards for the
Supervision of International Banking Groups and Their Cross-Border Establishments. Like
the provisions of the FBSEA, the Basle standards also require consolidated supervision, prior
consent by the host-country supervisory authority, and the right to information by the hostcountry supervisory authority. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and their Cross-Border

Establishments (July 1992) (visited Apr. 1999) <http:www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>.
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While the BCCI affair ultimately had little impact on U.K. banking
regulation, the collapse of Barings did. BCCI had been viewed as a
rogue institution. This mitigated the Bank's failures with regard to its
supervision. Barings was a completely different story. Barings had been
under the Bank's supervision for well over one hundred years. Members
of the Barings family had served on the Bank's Court (board of directors) and had provided a Governor of the Bank. If a system based on
principles of trust, candor, and cooperation was ever to work effectively,
Barings would surely provide a test case.
Once again, however, the Bank was found to be lacking inquisitiveness. 197 The Bank failed to question the large trading profits reported by
Barings on the back of its Singapore operations. The Bank permitted a
situation in which some very large intra-group exposures-the funding
for the margin calls by the Singapore Monetary Exchange ("SIMEX")were not reported. Moreover, the Bank failed to identify serious management inadequacies that existed at all levels at Barings.
The investigation of the Barings collapse was conducted not by an
independent expert, as in the case of BCCI, but by the Bank's Board of
Banking Supervision."' Among other things, the Board recommended a
thorough review of the Bank's supervisory system. Arthur Andersen
was hired for the job. Their report stopped short of recommending a
more formal, rule based approach to supervision. They did, however,
observe that the discretionary approach utilized by the Bank placed a
considerable premium on individual supervisors' ability to relate their
judgments to the overall objectives of supervision, and it also required a
good understanding of both the nature and risk of a particular institution's business. Arthur Andersen concluded that the Bank's supervisory
methods needed to become more professional and standardized. This
would require enhanced training for supervisors and deeper understanding of the operations of the institutions supervised. More specifically,
the Andersen team developed a model for a standardized system of assessing risk, much like the CAMELS ratings used in the United
States. 199
197. In its February 1997 report on the episode, the all-party House of Commons
Treasury Select Committee exhibited a clear sense of exasperation that yet again the Bank's

supervisors had failed to be sufficiently alert to the emerging problem.
198. It appears that in the short-term, the government wanted to avoid a major new
policy initiative. With a small and dwindling majority in parliament, the Conservative government may not have been prepared to introduce new banking legislation.
199. CAMELS (originally CAMEL) is an acronym for a six factor rating system which
assesses capital adequacy, asset quality, management ability and effectiveness, earnings
quantity and quality, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. Each of the six factors is ranked
on a scale of one to five, one being strong and five being unsatisfactory. Each bank then
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The Bank accepted Andersen's recommendations and set about implementing them. Before long, however, the new Labour government
would bring about a radical change in the supervision of the entire U.K.
financial industry and the Bank would not be given the opportunity to
reform its supervisory practices. 00
2. Mounting Formalism
At the same time that the Bank of England was adjusting, or not, to
its relatively new statutory supervisory powers, outside elements had
pushed the Bank to a more formal scheme of regulation. The Bank had
long prided itself on its flexible approach to supervision. It drew a contrast between "supervision," which it performed, and "regulation," as
practiced by regulators in other jurisdictions, like the United States, and
in the United Kingdom's own securities regulators. 0 In practice, this
meant that the Bank preferred to operate with broad discretion. Formal,
detailed rules were kept to a minimum, and policy was promulgated in
the form of "Notices" issued periodically by the Bank on specific subjects. Policy Notices were not intended to be formal legal documents.
Instead, they were meant to provide broad, general guidance and permitted considerable leeway in their application to individual cases. The
rise of European law, however, had a subtle but fundamental impact on
the Bank's Policy Notice system.
By the late 1980s, the Policy Notices had become the mechanism
through which European Union directives on bank regulation were implemented in the United Kingdom. This meant that the system of
Notices ceased to be the sole responsibility of the Bank, because since
the Treasury and Treasury Solicitors department had to ensure that they
complied with the United Kingdom's obligations under the directive.
Thus, the Bank's Policy Notices gradually became more formal and prescriptive, and provided for less discretion in their application to
individual cases.

receives a composite rating. Ratings are not released to the public. Uniform Financial Rating
System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021, 67,022-023 (1996).
200. See infra Part II.F.3.
201. Brian Quinn, former Executive Director of the Bank said that regulation "is about
rules and about the precise formulation and policing of those rules. In respect of financial
services it calls for the codification of a corpus of strictly defined and detailed rules relating
to particular activities, products and services." He described supervision, on the other hand,
as "set[ting] the framework within which authorised companies may operate, rather than
prescribing in detail how the relevant goods and services should be provided. Within that

context, the companies providing those goods and services are, broadly speaking, left to
make their own business decisions." Brian Quinn, The Bank of England's Role in Prudential
Supervision, 33 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 260, 260-61 (1993).
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The European Union sought to create a system of authorization that
would allow for banks to operate throughout the Union on the basis of a
single authorization. The single authorization concept is set forth in the
"Second Banking Co-ordination Directive."20 2 The adoption of common
minimum prudential standards is central to this concept. While some of
these prudential standards were modeled on the Bank's pre-existing
practice, others were not. Moreover, these directives setting forth
prudential standards contained extensive detail regarding their application, reducing the Bank's discretion in applying these
regulatory norms and requirements. °3
Similar to the impact of European Union law on the United Kingdom's regulatory regime, international agreements have further
formalized, from different starting points, both the United States and
United Kingdom's approach to capital adequacy requirements. ' Naturally, both the United States and United Kingdom used capital
measurements as one of their key supervisory tools, but prior to the
205

In1980s, neither country had formal capital adequacy requirements.
creased international competition spurred a dialogue between U.S.
regulators and the Bank of England, which in 1987 resulted in an
agreement on risk-based capital. The United States/United Kingdom

202. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking-up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (No. L
386) 1 [hereinafter Second Banking Directive or 2BCD]. Under 2BCD, the EU Member
States have agreed mutually to recognize authorizations granted by each other, subject to the
observation of minimum standards of prudential regulation. The purpose is to create a single
market in financial services within the EU.
203. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the implementation of the EU's directive
on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions which establishes a methodology for calculating capital requirements in respect of the market risks of both banks and
securities firms. This directive contains extensive detail about the method of calculation to
be adopted in assessing the capital required against equity and bond positions and their various derivatives. See generally Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the Capital
Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 1.
204. The Basle Capital Accord was subsequently enacted, substantially unchanged, into
European law by Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 April 1989 on Own Funds of Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 124) and Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency
Ratio for Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386).
205. In the United States, the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA),
Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (1983), established the first statutory capital requirements.
It directed the federal banking agencies to require banks "to achieve and maintain adequate
capital by establishing minimum levels of capital." 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (1994). Congress
also signaled its desire for international convergence of capital standards by directing the
banking agencies to "consult with the banking supervisory authorities of other countries to
reach understandings aimed at achieving the adoption of effective and consistent supervisory
policies and practices with respect to international lending." 12 U.S.C. § 3901(b) (1994).
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agreement quickly led the Basel Committee 0 6 to adopt a common
framework for measuring capital and minimum capital requirements.
The Basel Capital Accord2 °7 sought "to strengthen the soundness and
stability of the international banking system," and to provide a framework that would be "fair and have a high degree of consistency in its
application to banks in different countries with a view to diminishing an
existing source of competitive inequality among international banks. 20 8
The 1988 Accord established a definition of capital, which consists of
core capital, or basic equity, and supplementary capital, which includes
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions, hybrid
debt capital instruments, and subordinated term debt. It also established
weighted risk ratios for on and off balance sheet items, and a target
minimum standard of eight percent.2 9 In June of 1999, the Basel Committee issued a consultative paper introducing a new capital adequacy
framework to replace the 1988 Accord. 20 The consultative paper
(revised Accord) outlines a framework consisting of three "pillars":
minimum regulatory capital, supervisory review, and market discipline.
The first pillar builds on the framework of the 1988 Accord and seeks to
"clarify and broaden the scope of application of the current Accord.",2 '
The second pillar emphasizes the role of supervision and considers the
possibility of using a bank's internal ratings and credit risk modeling for
regulatory capital purposes.2 2 The third pillar, market discipline, emphasizes the role of improved transparency in private sector monitoring of
capital adequacy. Comments on the Revised Accord are due to the Basel
Committee by March 31, 2000.
The focus on capital adequacy requirements as an international supervisory tool has had significant ripple effects in domestic regulation as
well. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of

206. See Core Principles, supra note 1.
207. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurements and Capital Standards (July 1988) (visited Apr. 11, 1999) <http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm>.
208. Id. at 1.
209. The United States implemented the 1988 Accord through regulatory initiative. See
12 C.F.R. pt. 208 (1999); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3.10 and 3.11 (1999); 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 (1999).
210. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, A New Capital Adequacy Framework (visited September 26, 1999) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs.htm>.
211. Id.
212. Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., speculates that use of internal
bank ratings and credit risk modeling is promising, but far off: "But given the current state of
the art of these methodologies ... it is questionable whether they will be feasible in the near
term." News Release, Comptroller of the Currency, NR 99-53 (June 7, 1999) (available on
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency website, <http://www.occ.treas.gov/

99rellst.htm>).
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1991 (FDICIA)," 3 passed in response to the crisis of the 1980s and
1990s in an effort to protect the deposit insurance fund,2' 4 uses capital
adequacy as the springboard for an increasingly formal system of regulation. With the passage of FDICIA, Congress limited federal banking
agencies' discretion and mandated the exercise of their enforcement
powers long before an institution fails or faces imminent threat of failure. The prompt corrective action provisions of FDICIA" 5 forced the
regulators to assume a more formal and proactive role with regard to
supervision of operating institutions. Under FDICIA, the failure of a
bank to meet defined capital 216 and safety and soundness standards 2 7 sets
various supervisory controls in motion.2 8 FDICIA also mandated not
21 9
less than one full-scope on-site examination each twelve-month period
and imposed new internal and external audit requirements. FDICIA
made important changes to the system of deposit insurance as well. It
required the FDIC to adopt a system of risk-based premiums. It also
prohibited institutions that are not "well-capitalized" from accepting
brokered deposits. FDICIA made important changes to the treatment of
failed banks by requiring the FDIC to resolve bank insolvencies in a
manner that is the "least costly" to the bank insurance fund 220 and by
limiting the FDIC's power to provide financial assistance to open
Reserves discount window
banks. 22' Finally, FDICIA limited the Federal
22
lending to undercapitalized institutions.
3. Recent Deregulation and Reform
Given the healthy state of the banking industry since the early
1990s, reform in the United States in recent years has been decidedly
deregulatory. In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate
213. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
214. Congress stated that the purpose of the prompt corrective action provisions "is to
resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term loss to
the deposit insurance fund." 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
215. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (Supp. 1999).
216. See id.
217. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (Supp. 1999).
218. The statute provides that "[elach appropriate Federal banking agency and the
[FDIC] ... shall carry out the purpose of this section by taking prompt corrective action to
resolve the problems of insured depository institutions." 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(a)(2) (Supp.
1999) (emphasis added).
219. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(1) (1994). Small and well-capitalized institutions must be examined every 18 months. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)(4).
220. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (1994). The only exception to the "least costly" principle
are insolvency cases involving systemic risk. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G).
221. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(8)(A).
222. 12. U.S.C. § 347b(b) (1994).
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Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 ("IBBEA") 223 that repealed the McFadden Act's interstate banking restrictions 224 and the
Douglas Amendment's restrictions on intrastate bank holding company
acquisitions.2 2 5 The IBBEA shows noteworthy deference to states' restrictions on branching. While the IBBEA eliminated state law
restrictions on bank holding company acquisitions across state lines,226 it
stopped short of usurping a state's right to decide whether interstate
branching would be permissible within its borders. The IBBEA permits
the federal banking agencies to approve mergers between banks organized in different states unless one of the states adopted a law, after
September 29, 1994 and before June 1, 1997, that prohibits such mergers. 22 7 Only one state, Texas, adopted such legislation.
The deregulatory movement was not confined to Congress. Significant deregulation since the 1980s can also be found at the agency level.
Perhaps the most visible forms of agency deregulation have been in the
area of banks' securities activities. In 1987, the Federal Reserve Board
approved an application by Citicorp, J.P. Morgan, and Bankers Trust,
allowing the bank holding companies to create a non-bank subsidiarycommonly referred to as a "Section 20 subsidiary"-that is permitted to
underwrite commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and mortgagebacked securities.22 8 The Federal Reserve Board's approval was based on

an interpretation of the "engaged principally" language found in Section
20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. 229 The Federal Reserve Board determined

that the Section 20 subsidiary would not be engaged principally in underwriting securities if the underwriting of bank-ineligible securities was
limited to five percent of the subsidiaries' gross revenues, and the activities with regard to bank ineligible securities did not constitute more
than five percent of the market for any type of security. In addition, the
Federal Reserve Board imposed certain "firewalls" to address safety and
223. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
224. The McFadden Act gave national banks the authority to open branches, but only to
the extent that a state bank was so permitted. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)).
225. The Douglas Amendment prohibited acquisitions of banks across state lines by
bank holding companies unless such acquisition was specifically permitted under the state
law of the bank to be acquired. Ch. 240, § 3, 70 Stat. 134 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1994)).
226. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A). In approved bank holding company interstate acquisitions, however, the Fed must abide by State age laws and certain deposit caps. Id.
227. 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(a) (Supp. 1994).
228. See 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987).
229. Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibits member banks (i.e., national banks and state
member banks) from affiliating with any firm "engaged principally in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
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soundness issues and potential conflicts of interest. 20 A federal appellate
court upheld the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation, but eliminated
the market share limitation."'
In the years since that decision, the Federal Reserve Board has incrementally liberalized its interpretation of permissible activities by
Section 20 subsidiaries. In 1989, the Federal Reserve Board approved
the underwriting of debt and equity securities for Section 20 subsidiaries. 232 The Federal Reserve Board increased the revenue limitation, first
from five to ten percent, 23 and then, in 1996, from ten to twenty-five

percent. 3 In 1997, the Federal Reserve Board eliminated most
2 35 of the
firewalls originally imposed on Section 20 subsidiary activities.
Not to be outdone by the Federal Reserve Board, the OCC adopted a
controversial rule governing the activities of operating subsidiaries of
national banks, commonly known as the "op-sub" rule.236 Most importantly, the op-sub rule provides that, assuming compliance with certain
procedures and safeguards, a national bank may acquire or establish a
subsidiary that 23can
engage in activities that would not be permissible for
7
the bank itself.
While the regulators have steadily expanded banks' securities activities, Congress has given serious consideration to legislation that
would repeal Glass-Steagall. On July 1, 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 10, a bill that would allow banks to engage in
securities dealing and underwriting through a holding company
230. The "firewalls" were imposed not under the Glass-Steagall Act, but under Section
4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act which restricts bank holding company activities
and investments to those that are "so closely related to banking." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)
(1994).
231. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
839 F. 2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
232. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192 (1989).
233. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 11, at 751 (1989).
234. See 61 Fed. Res. Bull. 68, at 750 (1996).
235. See 62 Fed. Reg. 45,295 (1997) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225). In 1998, taking
advantage of the Federal Reserve Board's liberalization of Section 20 restrictions, Citicorp, a
commercial bank, and Travelers, an insurance and investment banking firm, announced their
intent to merge. The Federal Reserve Board approved the merger on September 23, 1998.
FEDERAL RESERVE, Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to
Engage in Nonbanking Activities, Sept. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, Federal LegalU.S./Administrative Agency Materials/Individual Agencies File.
236. See 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342 (1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5 ,7 , 16, and 28).
237. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(0 (1999). Shortly after adopting the op-sub rule, the OCC
approved an application by a national bank for an operating subsidiary to engage in underwriting and dealing in securities of states and their political subdivisions. See Decision of the
Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City,
Utah to Commence New Activities in an Operating Subsidiary, 1997 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 127
(Dec. 11, 1997).
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affiliate.23 On May 6, 1999, the U.S. Senate passed S. 900, which would
also repeal Glass-Steagall. The Senate bill is opposed strongly by the
Clinton administration and industry lobbies because of the bill's proviso
that new bank activities, such as securities activities, must be conducted
through a bank holding company's non-bank affiliate rather than
through a bank-owned subsidiary. 239 Amid this intense focus on repeal of
Glass-Steagall and other New Deal restrictions, efforts
to restructure or
240
consolidate the banking agencies remain dormant.
In contrast to the United States, banking regulation in Britain has
always been carried out by a single agency, the Bank of England. However, in a surprise decision in May 1997, the newly elected Labour
government announced that it would create a unified regulatory authority for the banking, securities, and insurance industries.2 4 ' This new
body, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), will unify all regulation
presently conducted by nine existing regulatory bodies and will gain
significant additional powers of its own. A new statute, The Financial
Services and Markets Act, which is currently passing through parliament, will underpin the FSA and replace existing statutes regulating
banking, securities, and insurance businesses. In the interim, the Bank of
England's powers to regulate banks have already been transferred to the
FSA by virtue of the amendments made to the Banking Act 1987 by the
Bank of England Act 1998.242 One consequence of the decision to unify
238. See The Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. (1999).
239. The Comptroller (regulator of bank subsidiaries) criticized this approach as too restrictive on the prerogative of businesses to decide how to structure their businesses. On the
other hand, the Federal Reserve Board (regulator of non-bank affiliates of bank holding
companies) has insisted on this approach. See generally, Beverly Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in Support, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 1895
(1997) (arguing in favor of the Comptroller's position).
240. In the Fall of 1993, the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of a federal
banking commission that would regulate all FDIC-insured depository institutions and their
holding companies. See 1649 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,593 (May 3, 1996). The
Administration's proposal would have created a new Federal Banking Commission. Subsequently, however, Administration officials recommended delaying action on agency
consolidation pending Congress' resolution of proposed expansion of banks' securities and
insurance powers. Bank Regulators Urge Congress to Delay Agency Consolidation, 1649
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I (May 3, 1996).
241. While the Labour government's decision took many by surprise, it came at the end
of an extensive debate on the future structure of U.K. regulation. Michael Taylor's Twin
Peaks proposal was influential in that debate. See MICHAEL TAYLOR, "TWIN PEAKS": A
REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR THE NEW CENTURY

(1995). For a critique of Michael Taylor's

proposals and a defense of the then status quo, see the speech by the Governor to the Edinburgh Finance and Investment Seminar and the Glasgow Discussion Group on Finance and
Investment, Some Thoughts on Financial Regulation (February 28, 1996), in 36 BANK ENG.

Q. BULL. 213 (1996).
242. See MICHAEL
ACT

BLAIR,

1998 (1998), at 60-107.
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all financial regulation in a single agency is that banking regulation in
the United Kingdom will inevitably come to be more influenced by the
practice and style of the regulation of other types of financial institutions. This is likely to result in a regulatory system in which formalism
plays a much greater role than in the past.
III.

COMPARING THE

NRB OF U.K. AND U.S.

BANK REGULATION

Sound-bites capture the apparent contrast between the British versus
American style of bank supervision. The United Kingdom's is an informal, moral suasion based regulation, while the United States' is a
formal, statute-based system of control. As so often is the case, however, these generalities belie the complexities and dynamic subtleties
underlying two systems.
In contrasting the two systems, an- essential difference lies at the
threshold: Bank regulation in the United Kingdom developed largely
outside of the law. The Bank of England's form of supervision did not
rely on legal institutions for its authority. Its authority derived from private ordering, i.e., its close, trusting relationships with individual firms
in the banking industry. Even when the Bank was granted statute based
authority, it was reluctant to use it.243 In contrast, the U.S. system of
bank regulation is an almost purely legal system. The agencies themselves are creatures of statute with no history of private organization.
Bank regulation in the United States grew, in large part, out of antipathy
toward large banking institutions rather than trust in them. Through this
lens, this Part considers whether the NRB of each country displays convergence.
The NRB model demonstrates that regulatory regimes impose costs
and provide benefits to their regulated constituents. 24 On the benefits
side of the model, the United States and United Kingdom both have
provided their respective banking institutions with significant national
goodwill given the overall stability and strength of the respective governments and economy. In addition, both countries 1impose
competition45
limiting entry restrictions on deposit taking firms. Significantly, the46
United States provided earlier and more extensive deposit insurance.
Beyond the United Kingdom's threshold decision in 1979 to provide

243.
244.
245.
see supra
246.

See supra Part II.E.
See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the United States' dual bank chartering system);
Part II.E. I (discussing 1BCD authorization of credit institutions).
See supra Part lI.B.2.a.
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deposit insurance, 24 7 however, there are no apparent signs of convergence on the issue of deposit insurance. The U.S. system remains unique
in the breadth of protection provided and shows no tendency toward
change. The United Kingdom, as well, shows no signs of providing
greater protections than those currently in place.248
The cost side of the model is more complex. The U.K. has imposed
relatively few restrictions on activities, and it has not regulated banks'
investment or geographic location.249 While the United Kingdom has
eliminated activities restrictions, "° it has imposed relatively recently
formal restrictions on entry25' and capital requirements. The United
States has loosened activities and geographic restrictions, 52 but has
come to rely heavily on increasingly formal capital requirements and
247. Britain's decision to create a deposit insurance scheme does not appear to stem
from international competitive pressures but, rather, from domestic crisis. See supra Part
II.E.1 (discussing Britain's response to the Secondary Banking Crisis).
248. In this policy area, however, European law has been increasingly influential.
Council Directive 94/19/EC of 30 May 1994 on Deposit-Guarantee Schemes, 1994 O.J. (L
135) 5, brings responsibility for deposit protection into line with the responsibility for supervision by requiring the home state which authorizes a credit institution to ensure that its
deposit protection scheme covers deposits in all the EU branches of that credit institution.
Deposits in all currencies are covered, and are subject to a minimum compensation level of
90% for the first ECU 20,000. Implementation of this directive required Britain to dilute its
co-insurance principle, see supra note 161, by requiring depositors to take only a 10% haircut on deposits with a failed institution rather than the 25% required under both the Banking
Acts 1979 and 1987. Nonetheless, the U.K. authorities insisted that some element of coinsurance be retained within the directive.
249. However, the Second Council Directive of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of
the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 89/646/EEC, art. 12(1) & (2),
1989 O.J. (L 386) 7, contains formal limits on banks' investments. Equity holdings in an
individual industrial or commercial enterprise are limited to 15% of a bank's capital, while in
aggregate such equity holdings should not exceed 60% of its capital. See id. Although these
provisions limit the ability of some Continental European banks to continue with their past
practice of taking large equity stakes in industrial or commercial concerns, the practice has
been so rare in the U.K.'s banking system that the 2BCD limits and restrictions are without
real practical importance for it. Equity investments in banks or other financial concerns are
generally deducted from a bank's regulatory capital.
250. While Britain has never had formal statutory restrictions on banks' non-bank activities, until the late 1980s, a variety of agreements, administrative arrangements, and Stock
Exchange rules served narrowly to constrain them to the business of commercial banking.
The Bank of England disapproved of banks taking long-term equity stakes in industrial or
commercial concerns, and it could use its power of moral suasion to ensure that banks would
sense its disapproval. It also maintained an (unpublished) arrangement with the Department
of Trade, which regulated insurance companies, to the effect that neither would permit the
acquisition of a bank by an insurance company or vice versa. Finally, until 1986, Stock Exchange rules required member firms to adopt the partnership form, which largely precluded
membership by banks or bank subsidiaries. These various restrictions have now been dismantled.
251. See supra Part II.E.2.
252. See supra Part II.F.3.
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supervisory tools linked to capital, such as prompt corrective action."'
While the United Kingdom's style of supervision has become increas254
ingly statute based, it remains decidedly British, eschewing the
intrusive and on-site examinations of the U.S. system. Moreover, the
United States' reliance on an examination based system appears unwavering given FDICIA's mandate of annual examinations of most banks.
Finally, while it is impossible to predict the ultimate impact of the consolidation of financial service regulators into the United Kingdom's new
FSA, one can conclude with a high degree of certainty that no similar
consolidation of financial services regulators will come about in the
United States in the foreseeable future.256
These regulatory costs and benefits taken together, yielding each
country's NRB, should demonstrate a path of convergence, if the NRB
model has real explanatory force. Competition between bank regulators
to attract financial institutions to their respective jurisdictions might
have been expected to result in increasing similarities of styles, approaches, and instruments. The distribution of the benefits conferred by
regulators and the costs they impose on firms should have begun to resemble one another as competitive processes, and the ability of firms to
arbitrage between jurisdictions, bid away remaining national differences
in regulation. It should, in other words, be possible to identify a common direction of change in bank regulation, even if there remain
important differences in the detail.
Our investigation of the comparative history of bank regulation in
the two countries, however, fails to demonstrate a consistent pattern of
change. Recent history of bank regulation in Britain and the United
States shows regulatory policy moving across several different dimensions at once. The British system, admittedly, has come to resemble that
of the United States in the sense that increased reliance is now placed on
formal requirements to ensure the capital strength and prudential soundness of banks. Especially important in bringing about some measure of
convergence between the two approaches has been the implementation
of a risk-based approach to setting capital standards under the 1988 Accord. However, the mounting formalism of the U.K. banking regulation
since the early 1980s cannot be attributed to a competitive process vis-avis the United States. To a very large extent it reflects the influence of

253. See supra Part II.F.2.
254. See supra Part ILE.
255. See supra Part II.F.2.
256. U.S. lawmakers have been unable to adopt a plan to consolidate the four federal
banking regulators, let alone consolidation of other financial services regulators. See supra
Part H.F.3.
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European Union law, which is itself a product of negotiated convergence
rather than competition. The need to emulate or compete with U.S.
practice has been at best a minor concern. Although the U.K. system
may have become more formalized in recent decades, the systems of
bank regulation in the two countries have at best a superficial resemblance.
IV. DETERMINANTS

OF REGULATORY CHANGE

Our comparative history of banking regulation in Britain and the
United States reveals no consistent pattern of convergence that can be
attributed to regulatory arbitrage. The most significant evidence of convergence can 257be attributed to the anti-competitive process of negotiated
convergence. The significance of this conclusion rests not only on the
observation that the competitive model is seriously incomplete as an
account of regulatory change, but also on the consciousness that regulatory convergence will not necessarily result in efficient regulation.
Based on our study of U.S. and U.K. bank regulation, we find three
factors that are arguably of at least equivalent importance to competition
in explaining regulatory change. "' The first factor is the path dependence of regulation, i.e., rule competition takes place against a
background of prior institutional and legislative history which conditions the terms on which the different jurisdictions compete. The second
factor is that, even in a world of globalized financial markets, domestic
concerns loom large in the design of the legal frameworks within which
bank regulation is practiced. For the makers of bank regulatory policy,
whether legislators or regulators, the consciousness of competition from
other jurisdictions is only one factor among many other economic, cultural, and political influences that impact their policy decisions. The
third factor is negotiated convergence. While the existence of competition between regulatory regimes may result in negotiated arbitrage, it
may also result in attempts to limit competition through discrete agreements between regulatory authorities. Such agreements reduce
opportunities for convergence by competition.
Given its apparent stronghold on the bank supervisory regimes in
both the United States and United Kingdom, we consider first the issue
of path dependence. Our comparative history demonstrates that the defining decade for bank regulation in both Britain and the United States
257. See supra Part II.F.2. (discussing the 1988 Accord).
258. The factors we identify are perhaps of even greater importance that the existence
of competition to the extent that the last factor involves a process that reduces competition.
See infra notes 269-75 and accompanying text.
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was the 1930s. The New Deal legislation, which resulted from the Great
Depression, set the pattern for U.S. bank regulation which persists to
this day. 259 Recent U.S. legislative history in this field is to a large extent
a debate about the extent to which financial services firms should be
freed from the constraints imposed by this sixty-year-old structure. By
contrast, the important factor in the history of British banking regulation
is precisely that the 1930s did not result in fundamental legislative
change. The consequence was that British banking regulation continued
on a path determined by the Bank of England's informal supervision at
the apex of the banking hierarchy. 260 To a substantial degree, the subsequent history of British banking regulation is the story of the Bank of
England's attempts to free itself from the customs and practices it had
developed during the period of informal supervision and to adapt them
to the very different demands of a statute-based system. That its attempts to do so were ultimately unsuccessful is reflected in the recent
transfer of authority to the FSA, which will undoubtedly bring a different style of bank regulation in its wake.
The countries' different experiences during the Great Depression
established the basis for two divergent patterns of banking regulation.
The path dependence exhibited by the patterns set in the 1930s have
been the single most important factor shaping the subsequent forms and
methods of banking regulation in the two countries.
The importance of path dependence is closely connected with our
second main observation: that consciousness of competition from other
jurisdictions is only one, and not the predominant, factor that shapes
regulation. Domestic considerations-economic, cultural and politicalare undoubtedly more powerful. The structure of U.S. bank regulation
that was put in place during the 1930s reflected a powerful current of
domestic politics and its associated ideology that can be traced back to
the early Progressive movement. This ideology expressed itself in terms
of a deep-seated suspicion of the power of money and hostility to what
Justice Brandeis described as the "curse of bigness., 26' The Great Depression provided the catalyst for these political forces to remold
banking legislation in accordance with their presuppositions. The result
was a system of banking regulation that enshrined unit banking and
further segmented markets through the separation of commercial and
investment banking. The difficulties the United States has encountered
in dismantling this system of constraints on banking is testament to the
continued political appeal of this ideology as well as to the strength of
259. See supra Part II.B.2.
260. See supra Part IlBI.
261. BRANDEIS, supra note 112, at 162-88.
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the domestic interests that benefit from the limitations on competition it
creates.
By contrast, Britain has lacked a corresponding domestic ideology
of hostility to banks and bankers. A highly concentrated banking industry, based around a few large clearing banks, was established well before
the Depression hit. The strength of these institutions permitted them to
weather the storm much more effectively than their American counter262
parts. The result was that, contrary to the U.S. example, bank
regulation never became a popular rallying cry in Britain and the large
British banks were left to their informal, non-statute based methods for
another fifty years. When change did come, it was a result of domestic
political pressures, especially the Secondary Banking Crisis, 6 with the
addition of the complicating factor of membership in the European Economic Community. 64
Subsequent changes have also reflected the overwhelming importance of domestic political considerations, ranging to those behind the
introduction of the 1987 Banking Act to the formation of the Financial
Services Authority. For example, the formation of the FSA was overwhelmingly a response to domestic political considerations, from which
the international dimension to regulation was almost entirely absent.
Indeed, the international competitiveness of the City of London may
suffer in the future if the FSA imposes an inappropriate regulatory burden on markets-like the Eurobond market-that have previously
enjoyed a policy of benign neglect from the regulators it replaces.6 5 In
addition, the bold move to strip the Bank of its supervisory role may
have been possible, at least in part, because the Bank historically had
sole responsibility for bank regulation. This has enabled critics to place
the blame for bank crisis at the foot of the Bank whereas in the United
States, with its extraordinary dispersion of regulatory power, it is more
difficult to assign blame.
262. Congressional law-makers who enacted the New Deal legislation in the U.S. might
also have looked over the border to Canada to draw a different lesson from the Great Depression experience. The Canadian banking system, like the British, was based on a few large
joint-stock banks with nationwide branching rights. They survived the Great Depression
largely unscathed. Unit banking, rather than the combination of investment and commercial
banking, seems to have been at the root of the problems of the U.S. banking system in the
early 1930s. See BENSTON, supra note 32, at 1.
263. See supra Part ll.D.1.
264. See supra Part II.F.2.
265. One of the most controversial aspects of the new Financial Services and Markets
Bill, which will provide the Financial Services Authority with statutory underpinning, is
whether maintaining "a vibrant, competitive, world class industry" should form part of the
new agency's statutory objectives. The government has decided that it should not feature as
an explicit statutory duty. See Joanna Gray, FinancialServices and Markets Bill is Introduced, FINANCIAL Thms FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, Jul.-Aug. 1999, at 19.
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One of the difficulties in applying the competitive model to a regulatory regime is the extraordinarily complex mechanism by which
regulators come to change the rules in their domestic jurisdictions. The
competitive model works best when a country has the ability to raise or
lower its NRB with the same relative ease that a private firm can raise or
lower the price of its goods or services. The reality in the world of
regulation is quite the contrary. In both Britain and the United States,
rule changes are intermediated by political processes, and as a result
many other factors than just the recognition of competition from other
jurisdictions can enter the process of change. A feature of both regulatory systems that emerges from our comparative history is that they can
be described as being scandal-driven in that the main factors influencing
the process of regulatory change are disasters, i.e., significant banking
system failures."' Under such circumstances, lawmakers will focus on
policy initiatives that will prevent similar failures, instead of on the
NRB's calculus of costs and benefits. 67
This observation highlights an important shortcoming in the way in
which the application of the competitive model conceptualizes the behavior of regulatory authorities as competing providers of regulatory
services, i.e., as competing firms in an industry. Under the competitive
model, the regulator is essentially a maximizer of its market share in the
global financial system. In reality, however, regulatory authorities do
not face a single, unambiguous utility function. In contrast to the management of a firm, 268 regulators must respond to the demands of a
diverse constellation of conflicting interests, including individual lawmakers, government officials and ministers, the industry they regulate,
266. See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation and Disaster:Some Observations in the Context of Systemic Risk, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 1998, at 405
(Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds. 1998). Professor Macey writes: "Disasters
bring an unusual amount of public attention and criticism to the legislative process. This
unusual level of public attention creates an environment favorable to legislation because it
overcomes the normal collective action and free-rider problems that generally prevent the
public from galvanizing into an effective political coalition for the purpose of seeking legislation." Id. at 413.
267. That is not to say that the impact of proposed legislation on the competitiveness of
domestic firms internationally will not be a factor in the consciousness of lawmakers during
a crisis. Such issues were debated, for example, in the wake of the savings and loan crisis.
See, e.g., Treasury Recommendations to Improve Competitiveness: Hearing of the International Competitiveness Task Force Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 101st Cong. (Jul. 27, 1990) (statement of John Lafalce, Comm. Chairman). Issues of
competitiveness, however, do not appear to be the driving force of this type of legislation.
268. That is not to say that firms lack constituents other than their shareholders. Firms
have them, and often respond to them. Those other constituents, however, lack the real
authority and power of the diverse group of constituents to which the regulators must respond.
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and the wider public they exist to serve. This means that rule competition, and the competition for market share, must take a subsidiary role to
responding to the demands of these different audiences.
Finally, the competitive model fails to adequately explain why
regulatory authorities may deliberately agree not to compete or why
such agreements can prove to be more stable than comparable agreements among firms in an industry. In the Introduction we stressed the
importance of negotiated convergence as an alternative to the process of
convergence by competition. Regulatory agencies that enter into the
process of negotiated convergence are effectively behaving like members of a cartel in that their aim is to limit or restrict the opportunities to
compete. For example, the 1988 Accord269 was formulated precisely to
avoid a process of competition between regulatory authorities, which
had become apparent by the early 1980s" ° From the NRB perspective,
such an agreement can only be interpreted as being intended to allow
regulatory authorities to engage in rent seeking behavior, i.e. by permitting them to dispense fewer benefits or to impose higher costs on their
firms than they would be able to do under a more competitive environment. Our analysis, however, indicates that motivations other than
simple rent-seeking may explain why regulatory authorities engage in
negotiated convergence. One especially powerful factor is that negotiated convergence allows regulatory authorities to respond to, and
deflect, domestic political criticism by diffusing responsibility for regulatory policy through international organizations."' Moreover, if the
competitive model applies, international agreements not to compete are
unlikely to prove more stable than agreements between the members of
an industrial cartel. The same incentives for participants to free-ride on
collective agreements should exist in the regulatory sphere as in the industrial one. 2 However, a noteworthy feature of the leading agreements
produced by negotiated convergence is that they are remarkably stable
over time.
There are a number of reasons why these agreements might prove to
be more enduring than similar agreements between competing firms.
First, negotiated agreements among regulatory authorities are often
269. See supra Part II.F.2.
270. See KAPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 104-05 (1994).
271. Kapstein emphasizes the domestic political factors, especially in the United States,
which led to the Basel Capital agreement. Id. at 106-08. Kapstein's analysis thus supports
that advanced by this Article, namely that such factors are more significant elements in the
process of regulatory change than is awareness of competitive challenge from regulatory
agencies in other jurisdictions.
272. See MANCUR OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GoonS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 33-36 (1971) (discussing incentives to abide by or break collective
agreements).
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translated into domestic law.273 While domestic law is not immutable,
significant costs thwart easy change once the law is established. Second,
unlike agreements among private firms, international regulatory accords
are public and publicized. This public aspect creates expectations by
parties not technically party to the agreements, e.g., international banks,
thereby creating a broader constituency. Moreover, while regulators may
have the incentive to "cheat" through lax enforcement of agreed upon
standards, the public nature of such agreements makes cheating easier to
detect2 74 and costlier for the regulators. 275 Hence, in contrast to the predictions of a competitive model, once standards have been developed
from a process of negotiated convergence they might be expected to become relatively permanent features of the regulatory landscape.

CONCLUSION

Our analysis of the comparative history of bank regulation in Britain
and the United States provides little evidence to support the hypothesis
that long term competition between jurisdictions will result in convergence towards a common NRB. We suggest a number of factors that
appear to explain why simple competition is comparatively unsuccessful
in explaining the actual path of bank regulation even during recent decades when the globalization of financial markets has been at its most
pronounced. In particular, the competitive model does not capture the
very important factors of path dependence, the saliency of domestic issues-economic and political-in regime design, and the process of
negotiated convergence. Undoubtedly, the future will witness a degree
of convergence between the bank regulatory systems of the United
States and United Kingdom as financial markets continue their march
toward globalization. We believe, however, that such convergence will
not primarily be the result of competitive forces, and therefore will not
be justified on the basis of the efficiencies that attend to a competitive
process. Rather, we predict that future convergence will be the byproduct of negotiated, multinational, agreements that cannot be justified or
criticized as the product of a race to the top or bottom.

273. See supra Part I.F.2 (discussing the 1988 Capital Accord).
274. Not only the parties to the agreement, but also third party beneficiaries have the
incentive to monitor for cheating.
275. The failure to enforce domestic law inevitably leaves regulatory authorities subject
to scrutiny from all sides, including lawmakers, consumer groups, and competitors of the
regulatees.

